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Robert W Hamilton *
HE most significant developments during the current survey period
in the area of corporations and partnerships were legislative. In
1983 the Texas Legislature made several changes in the Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act that materially increase its usefulness in a modem
complex commercial and corporate economy.' While these changes may
be viewed as narrow and technical since they deal with arcane issues such
as indemnification and "safe harbors" for dividend declarations, their sub-
stantive significance and practical importance should not be understated.
In addition to these legislative developments there were several interesting
and important judicial decisions during the survey period.
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Indemnification
For many years Texas has struggled with a primitive indemnification
statute that was based on the 1950 Model Business Corporation Act.2 In
the last decade the volume of litigation involving corporate directors and
officers has increased dramatically; the cost of such litigation has increased
even more dramatically. Indemnification permits these litigation costs to
be borne by the corporation rather than the individual officer or director if
the officer or director can establish either his lack of responsibility or good
faith.3 The policy argument in favor of a broad indemnification statute is
quite compelling: if desirable persons are to be persuaded to accept direc-
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I. Most of these changes were proposed by the Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Law of the Texas Bar Association. See Annual Reports, 45 TEX. B.J. 908, 908
(1982). In proposing these and other amendments the committee repeatedly emphasized the
importance of keeping the Texas corporation statutes modern and up-to-date in order to
avoid the flight of Texas corporations to more hospitable jurisdictions, such as Delaware.
2. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02, § A(16) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983). The
major saving grace of the pre-1983 Texas statute was its nonexclusive character. Careful
attorneys, therefore, could place more modern indemnification provisions in articles of in-
corporation or bylaws of Texas corporations.
3. See generally J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS: IN-
DEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE (1981) (thorough examination of indemnification); W.
KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 587-618 (1978) (discussion
of indemnification). The precise scope of the indemnification right is, of course, the major
policy issue relating to indemnification.
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
torships, they must be given assurance that their personal assets will not be
depleted by the cost of defending claims that often turn out to be ground-
less. Restrictions, however, must be imposed on the power of indemnifica-
tion to assure that persons engaged in clearly improper conduct are not
protected by corporate funds from the consequences of their wrongdoing.
The 1950 Model Act provision did not adequately address the problem of
the balance between these competing considerations. Earlier attempts to
enact statutes in Texas similar to those adopted in Delaware and other
important corporate states during the mid-1960s, however, foundered on
the shoals of domestic Texas politics. 4
The Texas Bar Association Committee addressing the indemnification
issue originally planned to follow section 145 of the Delaware statute. 5
Shortly before the committee began serious work on the indemnification
provision, however, a revised version of section 5 of the Model Business
Corporation Act was published in 1980, which sought to resolve unantici-
pated problems that had arisen under statutes similar to the Delaware stat-
ute.6 The committee decided to follow the Model Act version with only
relatively minor stylistic and clarifying changes. The committee proposal
was adopted by the Texas Legislature during the 1983 session.7
The basic policy issue that must be addressed by every indemnification
statute is to limit indemnification to situations where it will further ac-
cepted corporate goals and to prohibit it where it might protect or en-
courage wrongful or improper conduct. One commentator neatly
encompassed this fundamental issue when he stated that the goal of in-
demnification is to "seek the middle ground between encouraging
4. Candor compels me to state that I personally testified against some of the earlier
versions of this legislation, and the 1983 statute contains some of the provisions objected to
earlier. On balance the version adopted in 1983 seems clearly superior to the versions that
failed of enactment in Texas, though perhaps my perspective on some of these problems
may have softened over time. I nevertheless continue to believe, as indicated below, that
some of the provisions contained in modem indemnification statutes, including the new
Texas statute, are too liberal.
5. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
6. The draft of§ 5 was first proposed for comment in 1979. See Committee on Corpo-
rate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Personnel, 34 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1979). The final version appears in Committee on
Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnfication of
Corporate Personnel, 36 Bus. LAW. 99 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Personnel]. At about the same time the Committee on Corporate Law of the American
Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation commissioned the development of a new
version of the Model Business Corporation Act and a multivolume treatise, THE MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED. The new version of the Model Act did not
change the substance of § 5, which served as the model for the Texas statute. The new
version did, however, reorganize § 5 in an effort to make it simpler and more understanda-
ble. I served as reporter for this major revision of the Model Act and for the creation of the
new annotated volumes. The bulk of the work was done by a staff at the University of Texas
funded by the American Bar Foundation and the American Bar Association, with significant
support and accounting services provided by the University of Texas Law School and the
University of Texas Law School Foundation. The new Model Act should become publicly
available in 1984.
7. Texas Business Corporation Act, ch. 540, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3140, 3143-50
(codified at TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
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fiduciaries to violate their trust, and discouraging them from serving at
all." 8 The new article 2.02-1 of the Texas Business Corporation Act ad-
dresses this basic issue by creating different standards for different kinds of
conduct.
L A defendant who has been totally successful in theproceeding. A person
who is a party to a proceeding because he is a director is entitled to indem-
nification as a matter of right if he was "wholly successful, on the merits or
otherwise, in the defense of the proceedings." 9 The word "wholly" was
added to avoid the holding in Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson '0
that a director may be entitled as a matter of right to partial indemnifica-
tion if he succeeded in obtaining dismissal of some counts of an indictment
as a result of a plea bargain even though he pleaded nolo contendere with
respect to others." l The phrase "or otherwise" means that a defendant-
director who obtains dismissal of a suit on a procedural or nonsubstantive
ground, such as the statute of limitations or the grant of immunity in a
criminal prosecution, is nevertheless entitled to indemnification as a matter
of right. This latter principle was retained in the Model Act revision after
vigorous debate within the Committee on Corporate Laws. The propo-
nents argued that a person who has a valid procedural defense should not
be required to proceed to the equivalent of a trial on the merits, which may
be prolonged and expensive, in order to establish eligibility for mandatory
indemnification.' 2 If a director is entitled to indemnification because he
was successful "on the merits or otherwise" but finds it necessary to go to
court to obtain that indemnification (because, for example, there has been
a change in management in the corporation in the interim), he may also
recover the expenses incurred in securing the indemnification.' 3
The right of indemnification of the successful director is thus absolute.
This entitlement to indemnification, however, may be eliminated or re-
stricted by appropriate provision in the articles of incorporation.' 4 This
option was included to take account of unusual situations such as a newly
8. Johnston, Corporate Indemn!fication and Liability Insurance for Directors and Of-
ficers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 1994 (1978).
9. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § H (Vernon Supp. 1984).
10. 321 A.2d 138 (Del. 1974).
11. Id. at 142.
12. See Indemnification o Corporate Personnel, supra note 6, at 113. On the other hand,
one can equally well posit situations in which the defendant's procedural defense, such as
the statute of limitations, may mask undisputed misconduct. Similarly, a criminal defend-
ant who is granted immunity to testify against his co-officers would appear to be entitled to
indemnification as a matter of right. This is one issue on which I continue to believe that
modem indemnification statutes are too liberal. I see no reason why it would be impractical
to require some kind of preliminary showing that a defendant who has prevailed on the
basis of a procedural defense or a grant of immunity was not involved in improper conduct
as a prerequisite for indemnification. The California indemnification statute does not in-
clude the words "or otherwise." See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (West 1977).
13. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § I (Vernon Supp. 1984). As a result of
this provision, new management will likely not refuse to grant indemnification to a former
director who is entitled to indemnification.
14. See id. § U. For additional discussion of this provision, see infra note 78 and ac-
companying text.
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formed corporation wishing to protect its limited assets against dissipation
through payment of indemnification. As a practical matter, however, in-
demnification of the successful director is the clearest example of desirable
indemnification and it is probably unlikely that the option to exclude such
indemnification will be widely elected.
2. The director who has been held liable to the corporation or has been
found to have obtained an "'improper personal benefit. " Generally, a direc-
tor who has been found liable to the corporation, or to a third party in a
proceeding in which it was found "that personal benefit was improperly
received by him," is not entitled to indemnification.' 5 The prohibition
against indemnification when an improper personal benefit is involved was
added to the statute to counter criticism that the statute literally permitted
indemnification of directors or officers who incurred liability in connection
with share transactions, particularly under rule lOb-516 or section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.17 Even if a director received an "im-
proper personal benefit," however, he may petition a court of competent
jurisdiction that he "is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in
view of all the relevant circumstances," and the court may order indemni-
fication in its discretion.' 8 A director who has been found liable to a third
person where the transaction does not involve an "improper personal ben-
efit" may be entitled to discretionary indemnification on the basis of the
standards described immediately below. 19
3. The director who settles, pleads nolo contendre, or is found liable to a
third person, but does not receive an improper personal benefit. The eligibil-
ity of the settling director for indemnification is of tremendous practical
importance. A great deal of modem corporate litigation in which claims
for indemnification arise does not terminate by a definite finding of liabil-
ity or of nonliability. For example, most derivative litigation is settled
before judgment. The same is also true of much civil litigation brought by
the Securities and Exchange Commission. It also includes, moreover, two
other important categories of cases: those in which the director has been
held liable to third persons but has not received an "improper personal
benefit" under article 2.02-1, section C, and cases involving criminal
prosecutions. In all of these cases indemnification is discretionary with the
corporation; however, a director who is denied indemnification under
these tests has the privilege of seeking to persuade a court of competent
jurisdiction that he is "fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in
15. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § C (Vernon Supp. 1984).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). Under § 145 of the Delaware statute and similar statutes
in other states, the indemnification of such persons appears to be expressly authorized by the
statute that permitted indemnification in suits brought by third parties if the director could
establish that his conduct "was not opposed" to the best interests of the corporation. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
18. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § J (Vernon Supp. 1984).
19. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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view of all the relevant circumstances. ' 20 Many corporations, further-
more, commit themselves in advance by contract or bylaw provision to
provide indemnification in all cases where discretionary indemnification is
permitted. 21 The Texas indemnification statute considers in detail two
questions: (1) what standards should be applied to determine whether in-
demnification is permissible, and (2) who should determine whether or not
the standards were met.
a. Substantive standards. The substantive standard for permitting dis-
cretionary indemnification in these categories is that the director must
have:
(1) conducted himself in good faith; and
(2) reasonably believed:
(a) in the case of conduct in his official capacity as a director of the
corporation, that his conduct was in the corporation's best interest;
and
(b) in all other cases, that his conduct was at least not opposed to
the corporation's best interests; and
(c) in the case of any criminal proceeding, had no reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was unlawful. 22
The issue of whether a director is acting in his "official capacity" is of
particular importance since this issue determines whether the standard ap-
plicable is the director's reasonable belief that "his conduct was in the cor-
poration's best interest" or the less onerous standard that "his conduct was
at least not opposed to the corporation's best interest. ' 23 Article 2.01-2,
section A(4) defines "official capacity" to exclude service by the director at
the corporation's request in a variety of satellite positions, such as with
trade associations, with subsidiary or affiliated corporations, or as a trustee
of an employee's pension trust.24 In all of these instances a director may
be indemnified by the corporation by reason of his activities in the satellite
position so long as his action was "not opposed to" the corporation's inter-
est. 25 The same standard also applies to a director's general profit making
activities, such as securities market transactions, 26 that are not connected
with his service as director.
The availability of discretionary indemnification in criminal proceed-
ings raises problems that are of more theoretical than practical concern.
The rule that a criminal defendant who is found guilty may be entitled to
20. TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § J (Vernon Supp. 1984).
21. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
22. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § B (Vernon Supp. 1984) (emphasis ad-
ded). The Model Act provision from which the Texas statute was derived is identical in
substance. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5(a) (1979).
23. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § B(2)(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
24. Id. § A(4).
25. Id. § B(2)(b).
26. The improper personal benefit exclusion further qualifies the "not opposed to" stan-




indemnification from the corporation of the amount of the fine if he "had
no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful" 27 is certainly
questionable from a theoretical standpoint. When the state elects to im-
pose a criminal fine on a defendant even though he did not know the ac-
tion was unlawful, a corporation should not second-guess the state and
reimburse the defendant for the amount of the fine. On the other hand,
this principle will probably have little practical import. As a passing note,
indemnification under this standard seems clearly impermissible in con-
nection with traffic fines and other petty offenses where the person knew
his action was unlawful but realized that it was not very serious. 28
b. Who determines eligibility. An issue at least as important as the stan-
dards themselves is who should make the determination that a director
meets the standards and is eligible for discretionary indemnification. Arti-
cle 2.01-2, section F authorizes eligibility determination to be made by
(1) the board of directors, (2) a committee of the board, (3) the sharehold-
ers, or (4) independent legal counsel.29
The directors who are not named defendants may authorize indemnifi-
cation by a majority vote, if they constitute a quorum. 30 Where a quorum
may be obtained, this is likely to be the favored method of securing ap-
proval because it is simple, inexpensive, and involves only action by the
board.
If a quorum of disinterested directors cannot be obtained, eligibility for
indemnification may be approved by a majority vote of a committee con-
sisting of two or more directors who at the time of the vote are not named
defendants in the proceeding. 3I A committee may be utilized only when a
quorum of the entire board eligible to authorize indemnification is impos-
sible to obtain.32 Since a committee may consist of as few as two directors,
it is always possible to obtain board determination of indemnification so
long as there are two or more directors who have not been named as de-
fendants in the proceeding. The entire board, including the directors who
are parties to the proceeding, may participate in the selection of this com-
mittee, so that a quorum for the appointment of the committee may always
be obtainable. This minor degree of involvement in the selection process
by interested directors is arguably justified by a principle of necessity and
by recognition that committee selection does not involve direct substantive
involvement by the interested directors. Alternatively, the shareholders
may authorize indemnification in a vote "that excludes the shares held by
directors who are named defendants" in the proceeding. 33
27. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § B(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
28. Officers and employees who are not directors may be able to have these fines reim-
bursed since the statutory indemnification provided by art. 2.02-1 is not exclusive as to
them. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
29. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § F (Vernon Supp. 1984).
30. Id. § F(l) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
31. Id. § F(2).
32. Id.
33. Id. § F(4).
[Vol. 38
CORPORA TIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS
Finally, indemnification may be authorized by "special legal counsel"
selected either by the board or a committee by a vote that would have
authorized indemnification as an original matter.34 If an appropriate quo-
rum of directors cannot be obtained, and if two uninvolved directors are
not available, special legal counsel may be selected by a majority vote of
all the directors, including the involved directors. 35 Thus, no situation ex-
ists in which shareholder approval must be obtained before indemnifica-
tion may be authorized.
4. Miscellaneous issues. The new Texas indemnification statute ad-
dressed several other issues relating to discretionary indemnification.
Many of these issues were not addressed at all by earlier indemnification
statutes, including the Texas Business Corporation Act and the Delaware
General Corporation Law. These issues include the following:
a. Indemnication nofforeclosed byfinaljudgment or other action on the
merits. Article 2.01-2 expressly provides that the issue of eligibility for
indemnification is not foreclosed by a judgment or order against the de-
fendant, by the settlement of the case by the defendant, by his conviction,
or by a plea of nolo contendere. The statute states that such a determina-
tion "is not of itself determinative that the person did not meet the require-
ments" for discretionary indemnification. 36 In other words, even if a
defendant settles or liability is judicially imposed on the merits, he may
still seek to establish that he is entitled to indemnification on the basis of
the substantive standards described above. This provision is not as star-
tling as it may first appear since its primary impact is on settlements.
Many settlements involve only a nominal payment, and it seems clear that
the issue of eligibility should not thereby be foreclosed. In other situa-
tions, such as a criminal conviction, or a final judgment on the merits in a
case involving disputed claims of breach of fiduciary duty, the conviction
or judgment will probably foreclose indemnification as a practical matter.
Theoretically the issue of eligibility is not foreclosed by the judgment, but
the likelihood that the director may persuade finders of fact that he meets
the standard for indemnification in the face of the judgment or conviction
is slight. This provision does not create a presumption based on the sub-
stantive determination, but merely leaves open the possibility that the di-
rector may be able to establish eligibility for indemnification under article
2.02-1, section A, despite a judgment or conviction.37
b. Indemnification of amounts paid in settlement or to satisfy judgments.
Indemnification under the old Texas statute was generally limited to ex-
penses, including attorneys' fees.38 Under article 2.02-1, the scope of per-
34. Id. § F(3).
35. Id.
36. Id. § D.
37. See id. § A.
38. The prior statute permitted indemnification only of expenses actually and necessar-
19841
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missible indemnification is considerably broader. A person who meets the
standards of article 2.02-1, section B, for permissive indemnification may
be indemnified against "judgments, penalties (including excise and similar
taxes), fines, settlements, and reasonable expenses actually incurred by the
person in connection with the proceeding. ' '39 If the suit is brought by or in
the name of the corporation, however, indemnification is limited to ex-
penses. 40 Otherwise, an obvious circularity would result.
c. Obligations relating to employee pension plans. Included within the
scope of indemnification are "penalties (including excise and similar taxes)
[and] fines."'41 This article, along with article 2.02-1, section T, also ad-
dresses problems of directoral liability arising under the Federal Employ-
ees' Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).42 The first sentence of
section T states that the corporation is deemed to have requested a director
to serve an employee benefit plan "whenever the performance by him of
his duties to the corporation also imposes duties on or otherwise involves
services by him to the plan or to the participants of the plan. ' 43 This
rather elliptical definition assures that a director who is serving as fiduci-
ary of an employee benefit plan is nevertheless viewed as acting as a direc-
tor for purposes of article 2.02-1. Special treatment was deemed
necessary because of the broad definition of "fiduciary" in section 3(21) of
ERISA 44 and the requirement of section 40445 that a "fiduciary" must dis-
charge his duties "solely in the interest" of the participants and benefi-
ciaries of the employee benefit plan. The indemnification statute also
states that the excise taxes assessed against a director under ERISA are
classified as "fines" for purposes of indemnification, and that actions taken
or omitted by a director with respect to an employee benefit plan "for a
purpose reasonably believed by him to be in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries of the plan is deemed to be for a purpose which is not
opposed to the best interest of the corporation. ' 46 These specialized defi-
nitions permit the indemnification, on a discretionary basis, of ERISA lia-
bilities if the director can establish that he acted for a "purpose reasonably
believed by him to be in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of
the plan."
d ',uthorization" of indemnification and "determination" of indemnfi-
cation. The Texas statute, following section 5 of the Model Business Cor-
ily incurred by a person in connection with the defense of any action, suit, or proceeding.
See id. art. 2.02, § A(16) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983).
39. Id. art. 2.02-1, § E (Vernon Supp. 1984).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 26
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.).
43. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § T (Vernon Supp. 1984).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1976).
45. Id. § 1104(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
46. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § T (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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poration Act, distinguishes between "authorization" of indemnification
and "determination" of indemnification. 47 The basic idea is that the deci-
sion that a director is eligible for discretionary indemnification is quite
different from the decision that the corporation should expand its limited
assets in making a discretionary indemnification. The latter is described as
an "authorization" to indemnify to distinguish it from the "determination"
that the director is eligible for indemnification. Generally, "determina-
tions" and "authorizations" are placed in the same hands, such as the
uninvolved directors or a committee of at least two uninvolved directors.
In the case of a "determination" that a director is eligible for indemnifica-
tion by a special legal counsel, however, the draftsmen did not believe it to
be appropriate to place in his hands the "authorization" issue, which in-
volves the most effective use of corporate resources as between indemnifi-
cation and other corporate purposes.48 In the event special legal counsel
determines that indemnification is appropriate, "authorization" should be
by the groups entitled to name the special legal counsel. 49 Thus, the "au-
thorization" may be made by the entire board, including the directors who
are involved as defendants in the proceeding.
e. Application of "reasonableness" requirements. The old Texas statute,
following the 1950 version of the Model Business Corporation Act, permit-
ted indemnification only of "expenses actually and necessarily incurred." 50
More recent statutes permit indemnification of "expenses (including attor-
neys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and
reasonably incurred."' 51 The Texas statute adopted in 1983 distinguishes
between expenses on the one hand and indemnification of other items on
the other, and imposes a reasonableness requirement only on the former.52
A reasonableness requirement is clearly appropriate for expenses, but is
arguably less appropriate for determining indemnification of judgments or
fines (to the extent they are eligible for indemnification at all) since these
amounts are set by courts. Amounts paid in settlement are more analo-
gous to judgments or fines than to expenses in this regard, and it seems
undesirable to require the board or a committee to make a judgment that a
settlement is "reasonable" as a condition for authorizing indemnification.
The persons or groups that make determinations to "authorize" indem-
nification also determine the reasonableness of expenses under the Texas
statute.53 As a result, special legal counsel, called upon to make the diffi-
cult ethical judgments required to establish eligibility for discretionary in-
demnification, is not expected to pass on the question of whether certain
expenses incurred were reasonable in amount. This decision, like the deci-
47. Id. § G.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
50. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02, § A(16) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983).
51. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5(b) (1979) (emphasis added).
52. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN . art. 2.02-1, §§ H, K (Vernon Supp. 1984).
53. Id. §G.
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sion to utilize corporate assets for discretionary indemnification, was
viewed essentially as a corporate policy decision rather than an ethical
decision.
f What is a proceeding? Article 2.02-1, section A(5), defines "pro-
ceeding" to include a variety of nontraditional proceedings, such as ad-
ministrative, investigative, or arbitrative, as appropriate subjects for
indemnification.54 The statute also includes appeals in all such actions
and "any inquiry or investigation that could lead to such an action, suit, or
proceeding."55 This broad and somewhat circular definition was designed
to resolve by statute questions that had arisen under earlier provisions re-
ferring only to "actions, suits, or proceedings," or words of similar import.
The Texas statute now clearly permits, for example, the indemnification of
the expenses of a director who is called as a witness in a grand jury pro-
ceeding; it was unclear under earlier statutes whether such indemnification
was permitted.
g. Indemnification of officers and employees. The indemnification of of-
ficers or agents of a corporation is often required by contract as part of the
agreed-upon compensation of the officer or agent. General principles of
agency law may also authorize indemnification. Under most statutes the
relationship between these nonstatutory rights of indemnification and the
statutory right of indemnification is unclear where an officer or agent is
also a director. Following the substance, though not the language, of the
Model Act provision, the new Texas Business Corporation Act provi-
sions 56 carefully define the relationship between the statutory and nonstat-
utory rights of indemnification:
(i) The nonstatutory rights of indemnification of officers, employees, or
agents who are not directors are fully preserved.57
(ii) An officer, employee, or agent of the corporation may also be in-
demnified to the same extent as a director may be indemnified under the
new statute.58 This right of indemnification also extends to officers, em-
ployees, or agents who are serving, or who at one time served, "as nomi-
nees and designees" as a director, officer, or partner.5 9
(iii) An officer who is also a director is limited to the indenmification
rights of a director under the statute.60 This assures that inside and outside
directors receive identical treatment with respect to indemnification.
(iv) "Nominees" or "designees" of the corporation serving at the cor-
poration's request in another corporation, partnership, joint venture, pro-
prietorship, trust, employee benefit plan, or other enterprise may be
54. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § A(5) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
55. Id.
56. See id. §§ 0, Q.
57. Id. § Q.
58. Id. §§ 0, P.
59. Id. § Q.
60. Id. § 0.
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indemnified to the same extent as a director under the statute even though
these "nominees" or "designees" were not officers or employees of the cor-
poration. 6' The Model Act does not contain a counterpart to this broad
provision.
h. Advancement offunds for expenses. Another important innovation
of the Model Act that is followed in the new Texas indemnification statute
relates to advancement of funds for indemnification at the outset of the
proceeding, long before its eventual outcome can be predicted.62 Practical
experience with indemnification made it clear that indemnification before
final resolution of the litigation was often critical if the ends of the indem-
nification statute were to be met. Many directors were unable or unwilling
to advance personal funds to cover the very substantial costs of retaining
counsel and setting up a defense. Yet expert assistance at this stage may
well be essential if an effective defense is to be developed. Further, unless
advance indemnification is permitted, an undesirable distinction is drawn
between directors with large financial resources who could invest funds in
an adequate defense and those without such resources, who could not.
On the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile the various restrictions on
discretionary indemnification, which depend on the outcome of the litiga-
tion, with advance payments made at the commencement of litigation,
long before there has been any decision on the merits of the litigation. The
only Texas case dealing with indemnification concluded that advance pay-
ments were not authorized by the Texas statute.63 Resolution of this prob-
lem was a major justification for adoption of a new indemnification
statute.
The Model Act solution, developed as a "reasonable compromise," 64
was faithfully followed in the Texas statute.65 Basically, a director may be
granted advances on indemnification if the director makes an affirmation
that he believes in good faith that he is entitled to indemnification and
submits a written "undertaking" to repay the amount advanced if it is ulti-
mately determined that he is not entitled to indemnification. 66 The under-
taking, however, need not be secured and may be accepted without
reference to the financial ability of the director to make repayment. This
provision is justified on the ground that it avoids discrimination between
directors with ample financial resources and those without. A security re-
quirement would tend to limit advance indemnification to directors who
already had sufficient resources to finance their initial defense.
The major limitation on the power to make advances on indemnification
61. Id.§P.
62. See id. § K.
63. See Texas Soc'y, Daughters of the Am. Revolution, Inc. v. Fort Bend Chapter, The
Nat'l Soc'y, Daughters of the Am. Revolution, Inc., 590 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). This case actually arose under the Texas Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act, although the statutory language is identical.
64. See Indemnification of Corporate Personnel, supra note 6, at 115.
65. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, §§ K, L (Vernon Supp. 1984).
66. Id. § L.
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is the requirement that when a payment is authorized those making the
determination to indemnify must conclude "that the facts then known"
would not preclude indemnification under the statute.67 This provision
attempts to steer a middle ground between requiring a full scale investiga-
tion or review of the merits of the defendant's position before each ad-
vance is made and permitting those making the determination to "bury
their heads in the sand" and authorize advances even though the director's
defense stands little or no chance of succeeding and indemnification will
ultimately be denied.
Determinations to make advances of indemnification are to be made by
the same persons, on grounds, and in the same manner, as determinations
of discretionary indemnification: by disinterested directors, a committee of
disinterested directors, disinterested shareholders, or special legal
counsel.68
i Insurance. The new Texas indemnification statute retains the ex-
press power appearing in the previous statute that authorizes the corpora-
tion to purchase directors' and officers' liability insurance. 69  The
insurance may cover all the various liabilities that are covered by the new
statute (e.g., liabilities incurred when serving as a trustee of an employee
benefit plan), and in addition may insure against liabilities "whether or not
the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against that liabil-
ity under this article."' 70 The scope of this last clause is justified on the
ground that insurance coverage is limited only to "insurable events," so
that there is built-in protection against coverage that may involve viola-
tions of public policy.
j Reporting of indemnification to shareholders. In the course of the de-
velopment of the Model Act provision on indemnification, the draftsmen
made an effort to meet the most serious criticisms directed by academic
commentary toward earlier versions of the indemnification provision. One
complaint was that the statutes permitted directors or "special legal coun-
sel" to authorize indemnification in relative secrecy without every advising
shareholders that corporate funds were being used for this purpose. 7 1 The
Texas statute follows the Model Act in requiring that shareholders be
given notice of all such payments, 72 but improves upon the analogous lan-
guage of the Model Act by specifying precisely when the notice must be
given, and assuring that notice in all events will be given within twelve
months of the time of indemnification. 73 The Model Act simply provided
67. Id. § K(2).
68. Id. § L; see supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
69. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § R (Vernon Supp. 1984); see id. art. 2.01,
§ A(16) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983).
70. TEX. Bus. CORP ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § R (Vernon Supp. 1984).
7 1. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks. New Trends in the Indemnication of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1978, 1979-80 (1968).
72. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02-1, § S (Vernon Supp. 1984).
73. The Texas statute requires this notice "with or before the notice or waiver of notice
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that notice be given "with or before the notice of the next shareholders'
meeting."'74
k. Exclusivity of the statutory indemn!fication provision. In the skeletal
indemnification provision in the earlier Texas statute, many attorneys took
solace in the provision that the statutory right was not exclusive, 75 and
included elaborate provisions in articles of incorporation or bylaws that
often closely followed the Delaware indemnification statute. Because the
new statute attempts to define precisely the permissible outer limits of in-
demnification, there is no analogous provision in the new statute. To the
contrary, article 2.02-1, section M states that
[a] provision for a corporation to indemnify or to advance expenses to
a director . . . whether contained in the articles of incorporation, the
bylaws, a resolution of shareholders or directors, an agreement, or
otherwise. . . is void unless it is consistent with this article as limited
by the articles of incorporation, if such a limitation exists.76
A comment to the analogous Model Act provision notes that this language
is
not intended to preclude charter, by-law, or contract arrangements
designed to provide procedural machinery that is not inconsistent
with the statute or to make the permissive provisions of [the statute]
mandatory if and when the occasion for indemnification arises. For
example, a corporation may properly obligate the board to consider
and act expeditiously on an application for indemnification or ad-
vances, or obligate the board to cooperate in the procedural steps re-
quired to obtain a judicial determination . . or both.
Some corporations currently commit themselves, in one form or an-
other, to indemnify directors to the fullest extent permitted by appli-
cable law. The Committee believes that such commitments are valid
• . . subject to appropriate interpretation in light of the facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case.77
Presumably the Texas statute will be given the same interpretation.
I Restriction on the right of indemnocation. Most corporations want to
provide the broadest possible indemnification in order to encourage per-
sons to agree to serve on the board of directors. Some corporations, how-
ever, may wish to restrict the right of indemnification because of internal
control concerns between competing factions or because of concern over
the financial position of the corporation. The power to restrict the right of
indemnification by appropriate provisions in the articles of incorporation
is specifically recognized for discretionary or mandatory indemnification,
of the next shareholders' meeting or with or before the next submission to shareholders of a
consent to action without a meeting" and in any case, within 12 months. Id.
74. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5(K) (1981).
75. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02, § A(16) (Vernon 1980) (repealed 1983).
76. Id. art. 2.02-1, § M (Vernon Supp. 1984).
77. Indemnification of Corporate Personnel, supra note 6, at 116.
19841
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
for court-ordered indemnification, and for advances for expenses. 78
B. Dividend Restrictions
In 1983 the Texas Legislature made a number of important changes in
the statutory restrictions on the making of distributions, including divi-
dends and the redemption of shares.79 The draftsmen were largely con-
cerned with simplifying the problems of attorneys and accountants when
faced with the need to advise clients, particularly corporations with wholly
or partially owned subsidiaries, regarding the determination of the amount
of surplus available for dividends and share repurchases. A literal applica-
tion of the former statutes subjected corporations with subsidiaries to the
expense of preparing special financial statements for each entity that often
did not conform with generally accepted accounting principles or with
other statements prepared by the corporation. 80 The changes made, how-
ever, go far beyond this modest purpose.
1. Safe harborfor determining validity of distributions. Article 2.17 of the
Act was amended by the addition of a new section E, designed to protect
directors who declare dividends or authorize other distributions on the ba-
sis of routinely available financial records of the corporation. 8' Paragraph
(1) of section E provides that the
[dletermination of net assets and the surplus of a corporation, and
each of their components, may be based on
(a) financial statements [prepared] in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles [(GAAP)];
(b) financial statements prepared on the basis of the accounting
used to prepare the corporation's federal income tax return or any
other accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the
circumstances;
(c) financial information . . . that is prepared on a basis consis-
tent with [GAAP statements or with the accounting principles used to
prepare the corporation's tax returns];
(d) a fair valuation or any other method that is reasonable in the
circumstances; or
(e) any combination of such statements or information authorized
78. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.02-1, § U (Vernon Supp. 1984). The Model Act
scatters clauses authorizing the articles to limit the right of indemnification throughout the
various sections. The Texas statute sensibly groups the clauses in a single paragraph at the
end of the section.
79. See id. art. 2.17, §§ E-F (Vernon Supp. 1984).
80. The Act proceeded on the assumption that each corporation was a separate entity.
Thus, a corporation is arguably acting improperly if it considers the earned surplus of even a
wholly owned subsidiary as available for distribution, unless an internal dividend is first
paid to the parent by the subsidiary. On the other hand, generally accepted accounting
principles mandate that the financial position and cash flow of a corporation and its subsidi-
aries be consolidated for reporting purposes because consolidation is deemed more mean-
ingful than separate reporting.
81. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.17, § E (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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by this section.82
There appears to be the beginning of a trend toward the elimination of
financial restrictions that provide no meaningful protection for creditors8 3
and the creation of significant protection for directors, particularly direc-
tors of large publicly held corporations, when they rely on information
provided them by corporate officers in the normal course of their duties. 84
The Texas amendments are broadly consistent with these trends, and there
can be little objection to the motives behind these sections. There are, nev-
ertheless, practical problems with the method adopted by the draftsmen of
the Texas Business Corporation Act; the draftsmen of the Model Act re-
fused to accept provisions similar to those included in the Texas statute
despite the repeated urging by some of the same individuals who were
instrumental in the preparation of the revisions in the Texas statute. The
basic problem is that the "safe harbor" provided by article 2.17 is not a
self-contained statutory provision. It refers either to GAAP principles or
to the accounting principles followed in the preparation of the corpora-
tion's federal income tax return. 85 The principles referred to in both in-
stances are vague to some extent. For example, there is not complete
agreement as to precisely which principles are GAAP and which are not.
Further, GAAP principles are themselves the product of a continuing re-
view by various accounting bodies, so that the Texas statute now refers to a
changing set of principles prepared by national bodies of accountants.
Statutory incorporation by reference of standards that are subject to
change from time to time by outside groups have traditionally been viewed
with suspicion as involving standardless delegation of legislative
authority.86
2. Determination of the time at which the validity of distributions are to be
measured. A problem that has troubled corporate attorneys dealing with
the largely arbitrary traditional restrictions on the making of dividends
82. Id. § E(I)(a)-(d). Illustrative of the care with which these provisions were drafted is
the following clause: "including without limitation financial statements that include subsidi-
ary corporations or other corporations accounted for on a consolidated basis or on the equity
method of accounting." Id. § E(l)(a). These provisions deal only with the issue of
directoral liability under the Texas Business Corporation Act and are inapplicable to the
calculation of the Texas franchise tax or other state taxes imposed on corporations. Id.
§ E(2). This limitation provision was apparently added late in the legislative process at the
request of the comptroller's office.
83. The Model Act, for example, dramatically simplified statutorily mandated financial
accounting provisions by eliminating the concepts of par value, stated capital, earned or
capital surplus, and treasury shares. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the
Model Business Corporation Act-Amendaents to Financial Provisions, 35 Bus. LAW. 1365
(1980) (adopting changes proposed in Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model
Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Financial Provisions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1867 (1979)).
84. The Model Act contains broad provisions protecting directors who rely on such
information. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1979).
85. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.17, § E (Vernon Supp. 1984).
86. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 28-29 (1974). Problems may also be raised if direc-
tors rely on financial statements that were prepared in accordance with principles that were
GAAP at an earlier time, but have been superseded or questioned thereafter.
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and distributions is the time at which the measurements are to be made. 87
The problem is particularly acute in connection with the repurchase or
redemption of shares for promissory notes under article 2.03 of the Texas
Business Corporation Act, because the article was not clear as to whether
the insolvency and earned surplus limitations were to be applied only at
the time the shares were reacquired and the promissory notes issued, or
whether one or both tests were to be separately applied to each payment on
each promissory note. This issue was the subject of the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Williams v. Nevelow 88 and the subject of an amendment
to article 2.03, section F in 1973,89 which was questionably construed by
the Texas Supreme Court in dictum in Williams.9° Without waiting for a
definitive construction of the post-1973 amendments, the Texas Legislature
again addressed this issue in 1983 in language that appears to leave no
future uncertainty: "For the purposes of this section, payment for shares
acquired in consideration of any indebtedness or deferred payment obliga-
tion of the corporation is deemed to have been made on the date the in-
debtedness or obligation is incurred." 91 The result is that the restrictions
against distributions of assets by corporations apply only at the time of the
original transaction in which the shares were returned to the corporation.
This provision follows a similar section of the 1980 amendments to the
Model Business Corporation Act92 and is based on a weighing of conflict-
ing arguments: on the one hand, a promissory note reflecting the repur-
chase of shares is similar to a promise to pay future dividends, and it is not
clear why payments on such a note should not also be viewed as dividends.
On the other hand, the corporation could have paid out cash to the share-
holder (since the earned surplus and insolvency standards were met at the
time of the original transaction) and the creditors should not be better off if
a note rather than cash is distributed. The draftsmen accepted this latter
argument, suggesting that the protection provided by the fiduciary duty
standards of directors of a corporation and remedies with respect to credi-
tors' fraud would adequately safeguard any abuse of the intent of this
provision.
To avoid uncertainty as to whether the earned surplus restrictions are
applicable at the time of declaration or the time of payment of a dividend
or other distribution when there is a significant delay between the two
dates, article 2.17, section F provides definite rules for determining when
87. See Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 303, 313-19 (1965).
88. 513 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1974). The 1983 amendment essentially codifies the rule of
this case.
89. In 1973 the legislature added the phrase "or make payment, directly or indirectly"
to the word "purchase" in TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03, § F (Vernon 1980) (insol-
vency restriction). Apparently, the intent was to apply the insolvency test but not the earned
surplus test to each payment.
90. See 513 S.W.2d at 538-39.
91. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.17, § F (Vernon Supp. 1984).
92. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 45 (1980 amendment); see Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Financial Provisions,
34 Bus. LAW. 1867, 1872 (1979).
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the restrictions are to be applied: if the payment occurs within 120 days of
the declaration, earned surplus is to be measured at the time of the decla-
ration, but if payment is delayed by more than 120 days, earned surplus is
to be measured as of the date of payment. 93 This provision, however, does
not affect the rule of article 2.03, section F, which treats the repurchase of
shares for debt as occurring when the shares are repurchased and the debt
issued.94 The legislative history of this provision contains a useful chart
setting forth how this provision would operate in practice.95
The legislature also made conforming changes in article 2.41 of the
Texas Business Corporation Act, which imposes liability on directors for
93. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.17, § F (Vernon Supp. 1984).
94. Id. art. 2.03, § F.
95. The following are examples of how corporate repurchase and dividends may be
affected by the proposed amendments:
Jan. 1 Mar. 1 May 1 July I Resolution
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making illegal dividends. 96 The legislative history indicates that this
change was adopted as a "further positive factor for Texas in determining
which state is most advantageous in which to incorporate.19 7 In article
2.41 the act giving rise to liability is defined with precision as voting or
assenting to a dividend or distribution that, "on the date of that vote or
assent," violates a provision of the Act.
98
The legislature also revised article 2.41, section C, primarily to conform
120 days
Jan. 1 Mar. I May I July I Resolution
Art. 2.03, § F
Corporation Corporation Violates art.
repurchases is insolvent; 2.03, § F
shares for directors






Art. 2.17, § F
1. Corporation Directors Earned Repurchase Violates art.
repurchases approve; surplus not for cash 2.03.
shares for earned adequate
cash surplus
adequate
2. Corporation Directors Earned Note is Violates art.
repurchases approve; surplus not issued 2.03.
shares for earned adequate
debt (a note) surplus
adequate
3. Corporation Directors Earned Repurchase No violations
repurchases approve; surplus not for cash on of art. 2.03;
shares for earned adequate April 30 surplus
cash surplus (before adequate at
adequate expiration of Jan. 1
120 days)
4. Corporation Directors Earned Note is No violation
repurchases approve; surplus not issued on of art. 2.03;
shares for earned adequate Apr. 30 surplus
debt (a note) surplus (before adequate at
adequate expiration of Jan. 1
120 days)
5. Corporation Directors Earned Dividend No violation
declares cash approve; surplus not paid on Apr. of art. 2.38
dividend earned adequate 30 (before
surplus expiration of
adequate 120 days)
Memorandum from Marc H. Folladori to Gary A. Herman, "Miscellaneous Amendments to
the Texas Business Corporation Act ('TBCA') and the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation
Laws Act," app. (Feb. 28, 1983) (analysis of proposed miscellaneous amendments to Texas
corporate statutes) [hereinafter cited as Folladori Memorandum].
96. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
97. Folladori Memorandum, supra note 95.
98. TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41, § A(l) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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the language to current financial usage. Reliance by directors is protected
if they rely in good faith upon financial statements "or other information"
that are represented to them to be correct "in all material respects" by an
appropriate corporate officer or "reported" by an independent public or
certified public accountant to "present fairly" the financial "position" of
the corporation.99 The words in quotation marks were added or amended
by the 1983 amendments. The legislative history notes that remedies for
fraud, breach of fiduciary standards, and failure to meet the standards of
the business judgment rule could ensnare a director despite this article.
3. Loans to officers or directors. The statutory restrictions on loans to
officers or directors have long been recognized as unduly restrictive; the
1950 Model Act provisions from which they were drawn were long ago
amended. 10 The 1983 amendments in Texas finally removed these anach-
ronisms. Article 2.02, section A(6), the general powers article of the Act,
was amended to permit loans to officers or directors "if such a loan or
assistance reasonably may be expected to benefit, directly or indirectly, the
lending or assisting corporation."101
If a corporation may generally make loans to its officers or directors
when there is a reasonable belief that the corporation will benefit thereby,
a corporation should certainly be able to guarantee the repayment of a
loan made to an officer or director if the corporation reasonably believes
that the guaranty will benefit the corporation. As a result of the changes
made in article 2.02 of the Act, article 2.06 of the Texas Miscellaneous
Corporation Laws Act was broadened to authorize corporate guarantees as
well as direct loans to officers and directors.' 02 A memorandum prepared
by the bar committee described this change as providing an additional fac-
tor in Texas's favor with respect to choices of states in which to incorporate
or reincorporate. According to the committee,
[clertainly a jurisdiction which permits this kind of assistance to key
employees and policy-makers of a corporation would aid that corpo-
ration in obtaining and retaining important personnel. For instance,
this amendment would enable a Texas corporate employer to guaran-
tee an officer's mortgage note on his new house which he purchased
upon his transfer to his new locale as required by his employer. Indi-
rectly, this could also result in additional talented and financially ca-
pable individuals relocating in Texas, which would assist our state
both financially and otherwise. 0 3
99. Id. § C.
100. Section 43(e) of the 1960 Model Act was amended in 1969 to eliminate these restric-
tions when the section was recodified as section 48 of the 1969 Model Act. See 2 MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 4 (2d ed. 1969).
101. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02, § A(6) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The clause pre-
viously authorized assistance or loans to employees, but excluded officers and directors. A
conforming change was also made in art. 2.41, § A(4). See id. art. 2.41, § A(4) (Vernon
Supp. 1984).
102. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. AN . art. 1302-2.06, § B (Vernon Supp. 1984).
103. Follodori Memorandum, supra note 95.
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4. Loans secured by shares of the corporation. Another anachronistic pro-
vision in the Texas Business Corporation Act prohibited loans "secured by
shares of the corporation.'0 4 The concern underlying this prohibition was
apparently that directors might not realize that shares of the corporation
are not assets when acquired by the corporation. The Model Act provision
from which this was taken' 05 has long since been repealed. The corre-
sponding language was eliminated from the Texas statute in 1983.106
5. Board vacancies. The Act has long retained a distinction between va-
cancies on the board of directors (that are to be filled only by the balance
of the board) and newly created directorships (that are to be filled only by
the shareholders). 10 7 This dichotomy is unrealistic on at least two levels:
no inherent reason exists why the board, in appropriate cases, should not
fill newly created directorships as well as vacancies; similarly, no inherent
reason exists why vacancies created by death or resignation should not be
filled by the shareholders if that is otherwise convenient. In the 1983
amendments both of these anomalies were corrected. 108 Because of possi-
ble abuse by the board of a power to create new directorships and then fill
them without shareholder action, the power of the board to fill newly cre-
ated directorships was limited in two respects: the person named by the
board to fill such a directorship can continue only "until the next election
of one or more directors" and the board "may not fill more than two such
directorships during the period between any two successive annual meet-
ings of shareholders."'' 0 9 These limitations appear reasonable since they
would not hamper the board in the normal case in which a board wishes to
add a new director; the board may create a new directorship and fill it.
Doubtless almost all such situations involve entirely proper motives. The
legislative history of this provision states that it was included to
afford additional flexibility for directors in conducting their corpora-
tion's affairs. For instance, often when a corporation acquires another
corporation by merger, consolidation, purchase of shares, or purchase
of assets the acquiring corporation desires representation on its board
by representative[s] of the acquired corporation. This is desired be-
cause of the input these new representatives can offer by their knowl-
edge and experience with respect to the acquired corporation's
business. Presently, in order to increase the number of positions on
the board to accommodate the acquired corporation's representatives,
a shareholders' meeting must be called." 10
Because of the newly created power in the board to fill newly created di-
104. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41, § A(4) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983).
105. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 43(d) (1960).
106. See TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41, § A(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
107. Id. art. 2.34.
108. See id. art. 2.34, § B.
109. Id. This last clause, in particular, has the earmarks of a compromise. The legisla-
tive history indicates that the number was chosen by analogy to similar provisions in the
Texas banking laws rather than through a formula of some type.
110. Folladori Memorandum, supra note 95.
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rectorships to a limited extent, a conforming change was made in article
2.36 to prohibit an executive committee from exercising this power. I I
This restriction was felt to be appropriate because the Act prohibits an
executive committee from filling vacancies on the board.
6. Financial transactions by foreign corporations. Article 8.01 of the Act
contains a "laundry list" of factors that do not constitute the transaction of
business within Texas for purposes of qualifying to transact business in the
state. 12 In 1983 the legislature amended this list in a minor respect to
make it clear that neither a borrower nor a lender transacts business in
Texas merely by creating or acquiring indebtedness or mortgages or other
security interests in real or personal property. Prior to this amendment,
the language expressly covered only the creation of indebtedness." 3
7 Uncertflcated securities. In 1983 Texas adopted uniform amendments
to its version of the Uniform Commercial Code to provide for certificate-
less securities." 4 In this respect, Texas joins a growing list of states that
have adopted these amendments, which were first proposed in 1978.'1 5
Uncertificated securities have long been used by limited classes of issuers,
particularly mutual funds and more recently by money market funds. The
genesis of the proposal to make specific provision for certificateless securi-
ties for all corporations was the so-called "back office crunch" of the late
1960s, when brokerage firm administrative offices proved unable to keep
up with the avalanche of certificates arising from trading in the range of
ten to twenty million shares per day. Although these problems have been
solved largely through the use of computerization of records and central
depository corporations," 6 certificates generally were viewed as a clumsy
device to record trading and share ownership. As a result, interest in the
certificateless security approach has continued despite the solution of the
"back office" problem that gave rise to the original inquiry. Under the
new amendments uncertificated securities will probably become widely
used by closely held as well as publicly held corporations.
Chapter 8 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code consists of article
8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which sets forth a comprehensive
statute for certificated securities.' 17 This pattern has been left almost en-
tirely unaffected; the new treatment of uncertificated securities closely par-
allels the existing treatment of certificated ones." 8 The most obvious
11I. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.36 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
112. Id. art. 8.01, § B.
113. Id. art. 8.01, § B(7) (Vernon 1980).
114. Texas Business & Commerce Code, ch. 442, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2511.
115. By the end of 1982 these amendments had been adopted in Colorado, Connecticut,
Maine, Minnesota, New York, and West Virginia. See 2A U.L.A. 175 (Supp. 1983).
116. A central depository immobilizes certificates in the hands of the depository and per-
mits trading based on book entries in the depository corporation records.
117. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.101-.406 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1980 & Supp.
1984).
118. See generally Special Project, Uncert/cated Securities, Articles 8 and 9 of the U C.C,
and the Texas Business Corporation Act. A New System to Accommodate Modem Securities
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difference between certificated and uncertificated securities is that the cer-
tificate, which traditionally conveys information and supplies essential and
often binding evidence of ownership, does not exist. Rather, the issuer of
uncertificated securities keeps a record of the registered owner, of one
pledgee (if any), and of certain third party claims to the security." 9 The
issuer treats the registered owner as the party entitled to vote, receive no-
tices, and exercise other shareholder rights.' 20
If the registered owner wishes to transfer an uncertificated security
through registration, he issues an "instruction" to the issuer to make the
transfer. l2 If the various requirements are met, the issuer must register
the transfer,' 22 and the transfer is effective when it is registered on the
issuer's books.' 23 Within two business days after the transfer has been
registered, the issuer sends the new registered owner an "initial transaction
statement" that describes the security and notes certain liens thereon.' 24
The issue must furnish similar statements at least annually or upon the
written request of the registered owner.' 2 The initial transaction state-
ment serves as a substitute for the certificate to a limited extent, but it
serves only as a record of the interest and does not represent the interest. It
is not received in all cases.
8. Fraud in securities and land transactions. In 1983 section 27.01 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code, the old section of the Texas statutes
dealing with fraud in land and securities transactions, was amended in
both substantive and damage-measurement respects.' 2 6 The basic defini-
tions of "false representation" and "false promise" were not amended,' 27
but the consequences of making such a representation or promise were
amended as follows: (1) a person who makes a false representation or false
promise is liable to the person defrauded for actual damages; (2) a person
who makes a false representation or false promise with "actual awareness"
of the falsity is liable, in addition, for exemplary damages; and (3) a person
who benefits from a false representation or false promise commits fraud if
he is actually aware of the falsity of the representation or promise and does
not disclose it.128 Under the literal language of section 27.01 before its
amendment, a person who benefits from a false representation or false
Transactions, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 813 (1980) (discussion of proposed 1983 amendments).
For a discussion of the desirability of the pattern adopted for uncertificated securities in
article 8, see Aronstein, Haydock & Scott, Article 8 Is Ready, 93 HARV. L. REV. 889 (1980);
Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1980).
119. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.403(d), (g) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
120. Id. § 8.207(b).
121. Id. § 8.207(d).
122. Id. § 8.401(a).
123. Id. § 8.313(a)(2).
124. Id. § 8.408(a).
125. Id. § 8.408(0.
126. Act of Sept. I, 1983, ch. 949, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5208.
127. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a) (Vernon 1980).
128. Id. § 27.01(b)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984). "Actual awareness may be inferred where
objective manifestations indicate that a person acted with actual awareness." Id. § 27.01(c).
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promise was deemed to have committed fraud merely by accepting the
benefit. 129
The damage-measurement sections were amended by repeal of the old
statutory measure of "actual damage," which limited recovery to the dif-
ference between the market value of the shares or land as represented and
their actual value, 130 and by authorization of "exemplary damages" as
well as actual damages without specification of the amount.' 31 The old
statute specified exemplary damages equal to twice the "actual dam-
age."' 132 Finally, a person liable under this section is now also liable for
reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, costs for cop-
ies of depositions, and costs of court. 133 These various amendments are
prospective only and do not affect liability on transactions entered into
before September 1, 1983.134
9. Venue. In 1983 the legislature completely overhauled the Texas venue
statute.'35 New section 3(f) dealing with corporations and associations
modifies the old section by eliminating the option to bring suit in the
county of which the corporation's "registered office" is located. 36 Suits
may continue to be brought in the county in which the corporation's "prin-
cipal office" is located. 137 One side effect of this change is that cases de-
cided before the present survey period, holding that a foreign corporation
may always be sued in the county in which its registered office is located,
are no longer viable. 138
10. Miscellaneous amendments. The Texas Legislature in 1983 also made
a number of minor changes in technical requirements, fees, and similar
matters. 139 While these changes do not justify discussion in an annual sur-
vey, at least a warning to practicing attorneys is appropriate: because of
129. Id. § 27.01(b) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983).
130. Id. The last sentence of the statute provided that the "measure of actual damages is
the difference between the value of the real estate or stock as represented or promised, and
its actual value in the condition in which it is delivered at the time of the contract." Id.
131. Id. § 27.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
132. Id. § 27.01(a) (Vernon 1980) (amended 1983).
133. Id. § 27.01(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
134. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 949, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5208, 5209.
135. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1983).
136. Id. § 3(f). As a result of this amendment, Ward v. Fairway Operating Co., 364
S.W.2d 194, 195 (Tex. 1964), which held venue is proper both in the county of the corpora-
tion's registered office and the county of the corporation's principal office, is now obsolete.
137. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1983).
138. Joy Mfg. Co. v. Briggs Weaver, Inc., 549 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1977, writ dism'd); Sheldon Petroleum Co. v. Pierce, 546 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Wiegers, 527 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
139. For example, the legislature increased filing fees for articles of incorporation, reser-
vation of names, change of address of registered agent, articles of dissolution, assumed name
filings, and professional association filings. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 10.01
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
Article 5.13 of the Act was amended to require the corporation to make a notation in its
records that a demand has been made with respect to specific shares if a right of dissent and
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these numerous changes, a routine check of legal requirements should be
made before filing even familiar documents if a delay would be
inconvenient.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Following the general structure of recent annual surveys, the cases in-
volving partnerships and "piercing the corporate veil" are first discussed,
followed by other corporation and securities cases.
A. Partnership Cases
Two cases arising during the survey period involved the issue of whether
a partnership was created by an express agreement. In Gutierrez v.
Yancy ' 40 the court considered an agreement by which one participant con-
tributed the use of land for a farming venture and his personal services in
producing a crop of onions, the second contributed capital, and the third
appraisal is sought. In addition, if the shares are certificated, the certificates must be submit-
ted for notation within 20 days or the right of appraisal is lost. Id. art. 5.13, § B.
The legislature amended article 5.01, § B(4) of the Act to clarify that in a merger an
exchange of property or cash for shares as well as a conversion of shares into property may
be made, and that shares of a corporation other than the corporation that is a party to the
merger may be the subject of exchange in a merger. Id. art. 5.01, § B(4). These amend-
ments probably did not affect the substance of the article, but did clarify its intent. Article
2.06A of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act was amended to authorize a parent
corporation to create indebtedness if a wholly owned subsidiary, rather than the corporation
itself, received the "money paid, labor done, which is reasonably worth at least the sum" of
the indebtedness under the constitutional provision, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-
2.06A (Vernon Supp. 1984).
If a registered agent wishes to resign, he must give written notice to the corporation at its
last known address and must file a written notice in duplicate with the secretary of state
within 10 days after giving notice to the corporation. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.10,
§ D (Vernon Supp. 1984). The second notice must include the last known address of the
corporation and a statement that written notice of resignation has been given to the corpora-
tion, and the date thereof. The appointment of such an agent terminates 30 days after re-
ceipt of such notice by the secretary of state. Id. No fee for filing the notice of resignation is
assessed. Id. The secretary of state endorses both the original and the copy, files the origi-
nal in his office, returns the copy to the resigning registered agent, and notifies the corpora-
tion of the resignation of the registered agent. Id.
In 1967 the legislature adopted a streamlined procedure if the change only involves mov-
ing the registered office within a single county. Id. art. 2.10-i (Vernon 1980). In 1983 the
single county restriction was removed, so that this procedure may be utilized by a registered
agent changing its address anywhere within the state. Id. art. 2.10-I (Vernon Supp. 1984).
The 1983 amendment also conformed and simplified the filing requirements. It is not neces-
sary to list the "post office" address of the agent's old and new addresses, and, if the regis-
tered agent is simultaneously filing statements as to more than one corporation, each
statement may contain facsimile signatures. Id. Only the original and one copy of the state-
ment need be filed with the secretary of state; the copy is returned to the registered agent,
and there is no requirement that the corporation be notified of the change in address. Id. In
this context, the 1983 amendment relating to venue of actions against corporations changed
the general standard from "the county in which its registered office is situated" to the county
of its "principal office." See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. The result is that a
change of location by a registered agent from one county to another does not itself affect the
venue of actions.
140. 650 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
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contributed only his services. Profits were to be shared in specified per-
centages, but there was no reference to the sharing of losses.
The venture was not profitable, and the capital-contributing participant
sought to compel contributions toward the losses by the other participants.
At first blush this arrangement would appear to be the classic partnership,
with losses shared in accordance with the profits under section 18(1) of the
Texas Uniform Partnership Act.' 4 ' Because of earlier case law in Texas
that placed excessive weight on the express sharing of losses as a determi-
nant of whether a joint venture exists, ' 42 however, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proof of showing that a part-
nership existed.' 43 The court quoted section 7(4) of the Texas Uniform
Partnership Act: "The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no
such inference shall be drawn [in certain situations.]"144 The court refused
to conclude that this "inference" was sufficient to impose the burden on
the defendant to establish that a relationship other than a partnership was
created despite the sharing of profits. Instead the court pointed out that
expenses of production and marketing were to be paid solely by the capi-
tal-contributing participant, and that virtually no property was held in
common. 145  The court concluded that the "trial court could have con-
strued the agreement as one to share profits as compensation under a profit
sharing agreement."' 46 The case does not seem to conform with the gen-
eral intention of the Uniform Partnership Act to create a presumption of
partnership when there is a sharing of profits.
141. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 18(1) (Vernon 1970).
142. See, e.g., Tex-Co Grain Co. v. Happy Wheat Growers, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 934, 936
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ) (agreement not a joint venture because it provided
only for sharing profits and not losses); Fry v. Shaw, 508 S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dalas 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.) (no joint venture found); Ames v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 411
S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ) (agreement to develop and sell
land not joint venture because of lack of control and no sharing of losses). For sources
advocating that loss sharing is not a requisite of a joint adventure, see A. BROMBERG,
CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 35 (1968); 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE
§ 61 (Supp. 1982); Aldave, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 239, 240 (1979). For extensive discussion of the loss sharing problem in joint ad-
ventures, see generally Comment, The Sharing ofLosses Dilemma, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 429
(1963).
143. 650 S.W.2d at 172.
144. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 7(4) (Vernon 1970) provides:
The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be
drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise,
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord,
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner,
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the
profits of the business,
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a good-will of a business or other
property by installments or otherwise.




The second case, Hodges v. Braun ,147 involved a much more unusual set
of facts. Two doctors began practicing medicine together under an agree-
ment that provided for the pooling of net income and then dividing it ac-
cording to predetermined ratios that varied from 65/35 during the first
year to 50/50 during and after the third year. The two doctors maintained
separate bank accounts, however, into which each deposited his own fees.
At the end of each month a separate ledger was set up, all expenses were
posted, and the net income determined; at that point the ratio was applied
and the doctor who was "short" received a check from the other. One of
the doctors testified that this unusual method of accounting was estab-
lished "because we didn't want to be considered as partners." The case
arose when one of the participants discovered that the other was not in-
cluding all his income; the participant argued that a partnership existed
and omission of some income or at least the other participant's failure to
disclose that he planned to omit some income, constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty.148 To complicate matters even further, the pleadings of
both parties alleged that a partnership existed while both parties testified at
the trial that no partnership existed. 149 The court did not cite the Uniform
Partnership Act, but reached the common sense conclusion that persons
who testify that they are not partners should not be held to a partnership
responsibility in the absence of reliance by a third person on the appear-
ance of partnership. 150 The court also concluded that Hodges's testimony
that he and Braun were not partners was a "quasi admission" binding
upon him. 151
Other partnership cases decided during the survey period involve a mis-
cellany of issues. In Bragg v. Bray Employment Co. 152 the Eastland court
of appeals held in a questionable decision that venue of a suit against a
partner on a partnership obligation should be determined as though the
suit were based on an individual obligation. The partnership lease for ag-
ricultural goods, which was the subject of the suit, was signed by the de-
fendant's partner (apparently because the defendant was temporarily out
of the office "doing something with the machines"). Suit was brought in
the county in which the lease was signed; 53 the court accepted the argu-
147. 654 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
148. The jury found that the parties did not intend that all of Braun's income be included
in the pool, so on appeal the plaintiff shifted his argument to the nondisclosure point.
149. 654 S.W.2d at 544.
150. Id. The court distinguished Howard Gault & Son, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 541
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ), which held a putative partner liable
to a third person despite an internal agreement that the participants were not partners.
151. 654 S.W.2d at 544. The court relied on Mendoza v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Under-
writers, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1980), in which the Texas Supreme Court set forth the
technical requirements that must be satisfied before a quasi admission may be treated as a
judicial admission. The Hodges court concluded that Hodges's admission satisfied all of the
requirements, so that Hodges had sworn himself out of court. 654 S.W.2d at 544-45.
152. 649 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, no writ).
153. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (amended
1983) provides: "In an action founded upon a contractual obligation ... suit by a creditor
.. . may be brought . . . either in the county in which the defendant in fact signed the
contract, or in the county in which the defendant resides .... "
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ment that the defendant had not "signed" the lease and therefore venue
was proper only in the county of the defendant's residence. 154
In Durkin v. American General Fire & Casualty Co. 155 one partner flatly
refused to sign an indemnification agreement. His co-partner thereafter
executed the agreement in the partnership name. Since the obligation was
within the scope of the partnership business, its execution was within the
actual authority of the co-partner, and the original partner was liable on
the agreement despite his refusal to sign it. 156
The Texas attorney general has ruled that a foreign professional corpo-
ration may not qualify to transact business in Texas.15 7 Further, the attor-
ney general had previously ruled that a corporation could not be a general
partner in a Texas partnership without qualifying to transact business in
this state. 158 As a result, a District of Columbia attorney who had formed
a one-person professional corporation could not substitute that corpora-
tion for himself as a general partner in a Texas law firm; the attorney must
form a Texas professional corporation.1 59
B. Formation of a Corporation to Avoid Usury
In RepublicBank Dallas N.A. v. Shook 160 the Texas Supreme Court con-
sidered the extent to which creditors and debtors may utilize the corporate
form to take advantage of the higher usury limitations on loans to corpora-
tions. In Shook the bank had lent large sums of money individually to
Shook on a secured basis at the maximum lawful interest rate in Texas. By
late 1973 interest rates had risen so that the prime rate was above the maxi-
mum lawful rate in Texas on loans to individuals; at the same time the
value of Shook's security had declined precipitously so that a foreclosure
would have caused large losses to both borrower and lender. Shook re-
fused to have the loan taken over by a family corporation with substantial
assets and his wife refused to pledge her separate property as additional
security on the loan. A new agreement was thereafter worked out: Shook
formed a wholly owned corporation that borrowed funds from the bank at
a significantly higher interest rate; these funds were distributed to Shook,
who used them to pay off his personal obligations, including the note held
by the bank. Shook personally guaranteed the corporation's note. Shook
finally worked his way out of the financial bind. The collateral for the
bank's loan increased in value so that the loan was not "under water" by
1976 and was not longer classed by the bank as a "trouble loan" by 1979.
At this time, however, Shook filed suit claiming that the loan to the corpo-
154. 649 S.W.2d at 120. The court noted that the plaintiff did not name the partnership
itself as a defendant. Id.
155. 651 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
156. Id. at 45.
157. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-7 (1983).
158. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. WW-191 (1958).
159. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-7 (1983).
160. 653 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1983).
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ration was a device to evade the Texas usury laws;' 6 1 he demanded twice
the amount of interest paid while the bank counterclaimed for the unpaid
balance of the loan.
The jury found that the creation of the corporation was "a device or
subterfuge" to allow the bank to charge a higher rate of interest to Shook,
the true borrower, than allowed by the Texas usury statute. 162 The trial
court ignored this finding and entered judgment for the bank. The court of
appeals reversed, rendering judgment for Shook, 163 and the Texas
Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals and upheld the
transaction. 64
The use of a corporation to avoid a usury defense first became possible
in Texas in 1967 when different usury rates for corporations and for indi-
viduals were established by legislation. Different usury rates for corporate
and individual loans, however, have long been in effect in many other
states. Indeed, in many states there is a usury limitation applicable to
loans to individuals but no limitation applicable to loans to corporations.
The Texas Supreme Court made a careful review of the treatment this
problem has received in other states. The court described two different
approaches in other jurisdictions as to the availability of a usury defense
when personal indebtedness is converted to corporate indebtedness in or-
der to permit a higher level of allowable interest. 165 The majority or "New
York rule" distinguishes between a loan made "for a purely personal and
necessitous purpose" and one made for a personal "business or commer-
cial enterprise."' 166 A loan made for the former purpose is usurious even
though placed in a corporation; a loan made for the latter purpose is not.
The minority or "New Jersey rule" treats the issue as a question of fact as
to whether the corporation was used as a device to conceal a usurious
transaction with an individual. 67 This "question of fact" may turn on
161. The legislature amended the statute governing interest rates on loans to individuals
in 1981 and 1983. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-
1983). The predecessor of art. 5069-1.04, applicable to Shook, provided for a maximum
rate on loans to individuals of 10%. Interest-Consumer Credit and Consumer Protection
Act, ch. 274, § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 609, 609-10, amended by Act of May 8, 1981, 1981
Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, § 5, 274. The maximum rate allowed on corporate loans was 1.5%
per month. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Vernon 1980). (The legislature
added section 2.09A in 1981, which provides as an alternative maximum, that a corporate
loan rate may not exceed the floating rate specified by art. 5069-1.04, amended on the same
date.) Given the disparity between maximum rates on corporate and personal loans at the
time, the bank in Shook clearly had incentive to structure the transaction as a corporate
loan.
162. 653 S.W.2d at 279.
163. Shook v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 627 S.W.2d 741, 752 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1981). The
court of appeals reversed and remanded the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding
attorneys' fees to Republic for redetermination of the reasonableness of the fees. Id. at 750,
753.
164. 653 S.W.2d at 282-83. The court also reinstated the trial court's original award of
attorneys' fees to Republic.
165. Id. at 280.
166. Id. (quoting Schneider v. Phelps, 41 N.Y.2d 238, 391 N.Y.S.2d 568, 571, 359 N.E.2d
1361, 1364 (1977)).
167. 653 S.W.2d at 280. The court listed several factors considered by courts using the
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factors such as the voluntariness of incorporation, the corporation's
financial strength, the purpose of the loan, and the experience of the bor-
rower. A survey of the numerous decisions by Texas courts of appeals
since 1967 persuaded the Texas Supreme Court that there was a definite
trend within the majority of decisions to follow the "New York rule," and
the court ultimately adopted that rule for Texas.168
In applying this rule to the transaction before it, the court categorized
the loan to Shook as "in furtherance of his personal business enter-
prise."' 169 Shook also argued that the transaction was in effect a renewal of
a personal loan; the court rejected this argument on the ground that since
the bank could call in the loan, the transaction was a "new" loan rather
than the "renewal" of a loan. All of this was too much for Justices Spears
and Kilgarlin, who, relying on the jury finding that this "was a device or
subterfuge to evade the laws prohibiting usury," argued that "in no other
area of the law but usury do the courts approve a subterfuge to evade the
law."17
0
In periods of high interest rates, usury laws tend to have counterproduc-
tive results since persons will be denied credit if the legal rate is below the
rate that the market requires for the transaction in question. Usury laws,
however, have a strong political appeal so that the typical legislative re-
sponse to a restrictive usury law is to amend it rather than to repeal it.
Anyone reading the present Texas usury statutes will concur that they have
become exceptionally complex and probably have little practical effect ex-
cept perhaps upon the marginal transaction. It is interesting that the opin-
ion of the majority of the Texas Supreme Court in the Shook case seems to
rest as much on policy justifications as upon the categorization of the
transaction. The court stated that to prohibit a personal loan from being
renegotiated at corporate rates "would cause unjust results" since it
"would prevent the borrower sufficient leeway to protect himself especially
when a renewal might result in a successful pay back plus profits" and
"[tihe formation of a corporation at least gives the borrower a choice."' 17 1
The court concluded this discussion by commenting that "obtaining
money at a higher interest rate does not necessarily preclude profits for
both lenders and borrowers and it is often preferable over the alternative
of not having access to the money at all."' 172
New Jersey rule, citing Note, Incorporation for the Purpose of Borrowing at an Otherwise
Usurious Rate of Interest. Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 29 Sw. L.J. 959, 962 (1975).
168. 653 S.W.2d at 281. The court also relied on TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-
1.04(b)(2) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983), which distinguishes between loans for a "busi-
ness, commercial, investment, or other similar purpose" (for which a maximum rate of 28%
per year is provided if the loan is in excess of $250,000), and loans for a "personal, family,
household, or agricultural use" (for which a floating maximum rate between 18% and 24% is
authorized). Id. The legislature added subsection (b)(2) during the general revision of art.
5069-1.04 in 1981. See supra note 161.
169. 653 S.W.2d at 281.
170. Id. at 283 (Spears, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 282.
172. Id.
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In Stanley v. Conner Construction Co. ,13 also involving the usury de-
fense, a corporate president executed a note on behalf of his corporation
and also individually, in performance of his contractual commitment to
"personally and individually guarantee this Contract and co-sign the real
estate lien note." 174 The interest rate for the transaction was usurious if
made to an individual but not usurious if made to a corporation. Relying
on Universal Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart,175 the court held that
"guarantors of all kinds" are precluded from raising a usury defense when
the transaction is not usurious to the principal debtor, in this case the
corporation. 176
C. Corporate Names
The first case involving the legal status of the complex rules relating to
name availability promulgated by the secretary of state177 is Ergon, Inc. v.
Dean .178 The issue in the case was whether the secretary of state should be
ordered to revoke his approval of the name "Ergon Energy Corporation,"
on the complaint of Ergon, Inc., a Mississippi corporation qualified to
transact business in Texas. The plaintiff claimed that "Ergon" was a "ficti-
tious, fanciful or arbitrary word" so that a letter of consent was needed
under then rule 004.20.02.014.179 The court held, however, that "Ergon"
was not a "fanciful" name since it had an accepted dictionary-albeit not
widely used-meaning. Hence the court concluded that the secretary had
acted consistently with his own regulations.' 80 In the course of its opinion,
the court stated that "[a] violation of these rules is the functional
equivalent of a violation of the statute,"'181 a statement that must have
been pleasing to the office of the secretary of state.
D. Piercing the Corporate Veil
Two Fifth Circuit decisions during the survey period sharply illustrate
the problems involved in determining when a subsidiary corporation
should be viewed as the "alter ego" of its parent. In Edwards Co. v. Mono-
173. 651 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
174. Id. at 36.
175. 539 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. 1976).
176. 651 S.W.2d at 38-39.
177. Sec'y of State, 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 79.31-.54 (Shepard's 1982) (corporate name
availability).
178. 649 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
179. At the time, this rule provided:
A proposed corporate name may be deemed "similar requiring a letter of con-
sent" if any of the following conditions exist:
(3) Names containing a fictitious, fanciful, or arbitrary word may not be
available without a letter of consent, although the name might seem to be
available under other rules. EXAMPLE: Entex Production Company is not
available without a letter of consent from Entex, Inc.
Id. at 775.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 774.
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gram Industries 182 the court held that the parent corporation, Monogram,
was liable for the contract debts of its wholly owned subsidiary, Mono-
tronics, which was in turn the general partner in a limited partnership en-
gaged in the business of manufacturing and selling smoke alarms under
the name Entronic Company. Monotronics was formed for the purpose of
acquiring the smoke alarm business by purchasing with cash provided by
Monogram. Monogram conducted the smoke alarm business under the
name Entronic Company with scant respect for the separate existence of
Monotronics, though there was no confusion of entities that misled credi-
tors, no fraud, no inadequate capitalization, and no "milking" of the sub-
sidiary. The corporate subsidiary, in short, was not abused but ignored. 83
The Fifth Circuit found that alter ego liability existed under Texas law
because Monotronics
had no mind of its own, no body of its own, no will of its own, and,
indeed, no existence of its own. . . . Time and time again, we see
Monogram manipulating the Entronic finances and operation without
the slightest regard for Monotronic's existence. Because, as Mono-
gram well knew, Monotronics had no existence except as a piece of
paper. And now, after almost completely disregarding Monotronic's
existence, Monogram asks us to recognize it as a viable entity.' 84
In contrast, in Miles v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 185 the same
court concluded that Southwestern Bell was not the alter ego of American
Telephone & Telegraph Company even though Southwestern Bell was
182. 700 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 713 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1983).
183. In denying a rehearing the court listed the relevant facts on which it relied:
2. All of the officers and directors of Monotronics were either officers or
directors of Monogram.
3. Monotronics, although the "general partner" of Entronic Company,
never exercised any control over Entronic.
4. Monotronics did not have any employees, pay any salaries or direct any
production or sales policies or participate in such.
5. Monotronics had no telephone or office space.
6. Monogram paid for all expenses attributable to Monotronics such as sta-
tionary, patent search fees and filing fees.
7. Monogram performed all of Monotronics's bookkeeping and combined
all of Monotronics's tax returns with its own.
8. Monogram obtained all credit and performed all financing for
Monotronics/Entronic.
9. Just as Monotronics did not participate in the routine decisions regarding
Entronic's affairs, neither did it participate with respect to the major decisions
of Entronic's very life ....
10. Monotronics was, on occasion, not only a mere conduit for Monogram,
but was completely ignored [The court cites as an example a loan made by
Monogram directly to Entronic that was not recorded on Monotronics's books
until several months later and was never repaid.]
11. The $251,000 "capital" infused initially into Monotronics was never used
except by Monogram for credit purposes or, when the venture was in extremis,
to bankroll an attempted release of general unsecured creditors. This at-
tempted release was subsequently nullified in bankruptcy court. None of the
"capital" went to Entronic's creditors.
713 F.2d at 142.
184. Id. at 142-43.
185. 703 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1983).
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wholly owned by AT&T, had one director in common, and had numerous
business transactions and extensive areas of cooperation with its parent. 186
While AT&T required its subsidiaries to implement certain broad policies,
it nevertheless permitted each subsidiary freedom in daily operations and
autonomy in the conduct of its business and financial affairs, and each
subsidiary, of course, was well able to satisfy any monetary judgment
against it. 187
Several other piercing-the-corporate-veil cases decided during the sur-
vey period reflect well-established principles. In Moffett v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. 188 the plaintiff sought a recovery against a French subsidi-
ary of the defendant upon learning that the tire that had caused the acci-
dent had actually been manufactured by the subsidiary. The court refused
to pierce the corporate veil in this reverse situation because, even though
Goodyear and its French subsidiary had five out of eight directors in com-
mon, the court concluded that the French subsidiary was not dominated
and controlled by Goodyear and the two units' separate identities were
maintained. 189
Sumrak v. Tenneco Oil Co. 190 was an injury-in-a-store case, in which
plaintiff brought suit against "Tenneco, Inc." the apparent owner of the
store. That corporation answered through an attorney and responded to
interrogatories. The day after the statute of limitations had expired, how-
ever, it filed a motion requesting that "Tenneco Oil Company," a second
tier subsidiary of Teneco, Inc., be substituted as party defendant since it
was the true owner of the store; thereafter the court granted a motion for
an instructed verdict on the ground that the statute of limitations had ex-
pired before suit was brought against Tenneco Oil Company. The court of
appeals refused to pierce the corporate veil, but applied the Continental
Southern Lines reasoning' 9' to permit suit to be maintained against Ten-
neco Oil Company since Tenneco, Inc., had made no effort to substitute
Tenneco Oil Company prior to the running of the statute of limitations
186. Id. at 197. The plaintiff also sued South Central Bell, another subsidiary that had
no directors in common with the parent corporation.
187. The court did not explain why the plaintiff originally brought suit against the parent
corporation rather than the subsidiaries who allegedly released telephone records in viola-
tion of the plaintiffs right of privacy.
188. 652 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
189. Id. at 614. Citing Gentry v. Credit Plan Co., 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1975), the court
listed several factors for determining whether a subsidiary is simply a conduit through which
the parent conducts its business. These factors include whether the two file consolidated tax
returns, whether they keep separate books, whether they have common business depart-
ments, whether the subsidiary borrows capital from the parent or external sources, whether
the two hold separate meetings of shareholders and directors, and whether an officer of one
corporation determines policy for the other. 652 S.W.2d at 613.
190. 648 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
191. Continental S. Lines, Inc. v. Hilland, 528 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1975), held that in cases
of this character the plaintiff's suit should not be dismissed unless the true defendant was
misled or placed at a disadvantage in obtaining evidence to defend the suit. The substitution
of the parties defendant under TEX. R. Civ. P. 28 is appropriate in this situation even after
the statute of limitations has expired. See 19 R. HAMILTON, supra note 142, § 240 (conclud-
ing that Texas Supreme Court in Continental Southern Lines foreclosed use of the "laying
behind the log" tactic attempted in Sumrak).
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and the latter was not misled or placed at a disadvantage in obtaining
evidence needed to defend the suit.192
Hickman v. Rawls193 is the classic contracts case refusing to apply the
piercing the corporate veil doctrine. The plaintiffs agreed to do certain
designs and drawings for the defendant corporation's contemplated pro-
ject. The corporation turned out not to have sufficient assets to pay the
plaintiffs' fee, and the plaintiffs sought to recover from the shareholders
individually on the theory that the corporation knew it did not have assets
sufficient to pay them when the work was commissioned, that the corpora-
tion failed to maintain proper financial records, and that it failed to follow
appropriate corporate formalities. There was no showing of fraud or of an
illegal scheme. The court held that the shareholders were not liable, say-
ing that the separate corporate existence should be ignored under only "the
most extraordinary circumstances," and that "the overriding public policy
necessary to disregard the corporate entity must be more stringent in con-
tract cases than in tort cases because in contract cases the plaintiff has an
opportunity to select the entity with which he deals as opposed to tort cases
in which no such choice exists."' 94 In this case the plaintiffs argued that
they did not know they were dealing with a corporation, but that argument
was rejected, since the contract on its face showed that it was executed by a
corporation, not by an individual.
Many cases hold that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is not
available to the corporation or its shareholders when it works to their ad-
vantage. A tax case decided during the survey period, Delta Pipe
Fabricators v. Bullock,' 9" held that a corporation cannot reduce its sales
and use taxes by combining its operations with the operations of a wholly
owned subsidiary performing similar work. 196 The subsidiary was formed
for reasons unrelated to taxes: in response to a union demand that two
separate contracts be entered into, one for field workers employed by the
corporation and one for workers in a "pipe shop" operated by the
subsidiary.
Finally, in Dodd v. Charles Jourdan Boutique, Inc. 197 a corporation
named "Dodman, Inc." was duly formed and an assumed name certificate
was filed reflecting that its business would be conducted under the name
"Centipede Shoe Fashions." Unfortunately, however, the two owners of
the business thereafter conducted business in their own names "doing
business as Centipede Shoe Fashions." The owners claimed that they had
advised the plaintiff of the existence of Dodman, Inc., a claim that the
plaintiff denied, and the jury rejected. Applying traditional agency law,
the court concluded that the owners were personally liable on the obliga-
tions under the general agency principle that an agent for an undisclosed
192. 648 S.W.2d at 782.
193. 638 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
194. Id. at 102.
195. 638 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
196. Id. at 653.
197. 648 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
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principal is personally liable on the obligation. 198 Arguments about the
separate corporate existence of the corporation, confusion of personal and
corporate affairs, and piercing the corporate veil were apparently not put
forward.
E Duly of Care
In Meyers v. Moody' 99 the Fifth Circuit applied Texas law relating to
the duty of care of directors and officers to an Alabama insurance com-
pany qualified to transact business in Texas under the Texas Insurance
Code.2°° In this case the sole shareholder of an insurance company con-
tributed a life interest in a trust to the company, and thereafter artificially
valued this asset so as to create a surplus that enabled the company to use
corporate assets to acquire other insurance companies. Ultimately, the de-
fendant's unusually aggressive and leveraged expansion program led to the
collapse of the insurance company. The sole shareholder was held person-
ally liable as an officer and director for the losses suffered by policy hold-
ers upon jury findings that he acted "negligently" and that his behavior
amounted to "intentional misconduct or gross negligence."' 20 1 The court
held the business judgment rule did not protect the shareholder from lia-
bility for either the excessive appraisal of the life interest or the use of
198. Id. at 766.
199. 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982).
200. The court based its conclusion that Texas law should apply to the defendant on
rather attenuated reasoning. The normal conflicts rule is that the law of the state of incorpo-
ration (Alabama) controls the duties of officers and directors under the general internal af-
fairs principle. See, e.g., Graham v. New Mexico E. Gas Co., 141 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1940, no writ) (recognition by court of general rule preventing interfer-
ence with internal affairs of foreign corporation); Zarate v. Ateca, 99 S.W.2d 628, 631 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, writ dism'd) (court refusal to order distribution by Mexican corpo-
ration of assets to shareholders); Royal Fraternal Union v. Lunday, 113 S.W. 185, 187 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (dismissal when plaintiff sought injunction against Missouri insur-
ance company doing business in Texas under permit from state commissioner of insurance
because of lack of jurisdiction to supervise internal affairs of out-of-state insurance com-
pany). The court, however, relied on TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.14, § A (Vernon
1980), which provides that the Act does not apply to foreign corporations qualified to trans-
act business in Texas under a special statute such as the Insurance Code and contains the
following proviso:
[I]f. . .any such excepted foreign corporations were. . . granted authority to
transact business within this State under any special statute which contains no
provisions in regard to some of the matters provided for in this Act in respect
of foreign corporations, . . . then the provisions of this Act shall apply to the
extent that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of such special
statutes.
Since the Texas Insurance Code does not define duties of directors and officers, the court
relied on TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.02, § A (Vernon 1980), which provides that
officers and directors of qualified foreign corporations "shall be subject to the same duties,
restrictions, penalties, and liabilities now or hereafter imposed upon a domestic corporation
of like character and its officers and directors." The court concluded, therefore, that the
defendant "was subject to the same duties and liabilities that Texas law imposes upon of-
ficers and directors of Texas corporations," without squarely concluding that Texas law it-
self controlled the relationship between the corporation and its directors. 693 F.2d at 1209.
201. Id.
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corporate assets without regard to the interests of the policy holders. 20 2
After holding the defendant liable, the court considered the appropriate
measure of damages, an issue on which virtually no Texas authority exists.
The jury had determined that $5,000,000 would "fairly and reasonably
compensate [the corporation] for damages caus[ed] by [Moody's] negligent
mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties [and federal] securities viola-
tion. ' 20 3 The jury also awarded $1,000,000 in punitive damages. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed this award, relying on analogies to (1) suits involv-
ing the liability of corporate directors to creditors for utilizing false
financial statements, (2) suits involving fraud or deceit in general, and
(3) suits involving negligent mismanagement. 2°4
Anbeck Co. v. Zapata Corp. 205 involved the interpretation of a "work
out" agreement that provided that the price of a business purchased by
Zapata Corporation was dependent to some extent on the profits of the
business following the sale. The sellers of the business relinquished the
power of management following the sale, so that the sellers' entitlement to
the "work out" portion of the purchase price depended on the skill and
competence of the managers installed by Zapata. The business did not
earn the profit required to entitle the seller to the increased purchase price.
The sellers sued, claiming that the conditions had been waived because
Zapata intentionally prevented the business from attaining the stipulated
level of profits, or alternatively, that Zapata's negligence or failure to use
reasonable diligence caused the shortfall in profit. The contract did not
directly address the general standard of care in management that Zapata
was required to follow. The sellers argued that the standards of reasonable
diligence and due care generally applicable to directors of business corpo-
rations were applicable. 20 6 Zapata, on the other hand, argued that the
standard should be the more general one of "good faith and fair dealing."
The trial court concluded that the standard proposed by Zapata was the
appropriate one, and so instructed the jury. The appellate court affirmed;
it viewed the issue ultimately as a matter of intention as expressed in the
contract rather than as a general standard of conduct for corporations
202. Id. The lower court also held that the defendant violated rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1983), since he failed to disclose his belief that the trust instrument was not
transferable and he fraudulently misrepresented the value of the life interest. 475 F. Supp.
232, 243 (N.D. Tex. 1979). The Fifth Circuit did not pass on this theory, since the court
concluded that the damages recovered could be supported on the state common law theories
of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders. 693 F.2d at 1211.
203. 693 F.2d at 1215.
204. Id. at 1213.
205. 641 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
206. The sellers relied on the definition of due care that appears in § 35 of the Model
Business Corporation Act in formulating the following definition of reasonable diligence:
Reasonable diligence in management as used herein means that the person or
persons making and implementing management decisions used that degree of
diligence which would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the
same or similar circumstances to investigate and obtain the relevant and avail-
able facts and exercised such diligence in making and implementing such de-
cisions based upon such facts.
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (Supp. 1979).
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since it relied upon contextual arguments based on contract language, the
history of the negotiation, and the presence of a broad merger clause in the
contract. 20 7 Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the
Anbeck case is the importance of the seller's retention of control over the
management of a business if the contract contains a "work out" clause
under which a portion of the compensation is dependent on the future
operations of the business. If control is not retained, it is important to
provide some contractual guidance as to how much effort must be made
and what degree of skill is to be expected of the managers designated by
the purchaser. This solution is much less satisfactory, however, since the
application of any general standard is going to be difficult and different
formulations may not affect the outcome in close cases.
F Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
Two cases arising during the survey period involved the authority of
corporate agents to use corporate funds deposited with a bank or savings
and loan association, and the responsibility of the financial institution for
the misuse of those funds. In Collins County Savings & Loan Association v.
Miller Lumber Co. 208 Miller, acting as agent for Miller Lumber Company,
deposited corporate funds in the Savings & Loan Association and received
a certificate of deposit issued in the name of the corporation. Thereafter
he borrowed a large sum of money individually from the Association and
purported to pledge the corporation's certificate to secure its repayment. 20 9
Miller defaulted on his loan. When the corporation later sought to redeem
the certificate, the Association claimed that it was entitled to offset Miller's
unpaid loan against the proceeds of the certificate. In the subsequent suit
for conversion, the Association lost: the loan to Miller was a personal loan
and not a corporate loan, and there was no showing that Miller had au-
thority to use corporate assets to secure his personal debt. 210 This conclu-
sion is clearly correct, and the actions of the Association appear to be a
textbook example of sloppy banking practices.
In Upper Valley Aviation, Inc. v. Mercantile National Bank 2 H the general
manager of a corporation directed the bank to transfer corporate funds to
the account of another corporation that he controlled and that was in-
debted to the bank. The bank made the transfer under questionable cir-
cumstances and later used the funds to offset the unpaid loan. The bank
succeeded in obtaining summary judgment in a suit brought by the origi-
nal corporate depositor to recover the funds, but the appellate court re-
207. 641 S.W.2d at 613-14.
208. 653 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
209. Despite this pledge, Miller did not deliver possession of the corporation's certificate
to the Association even though the Association's president testified that standard banking
practice required the Association to take possession of a certificate that is pledged as collat-
eral for a loan.
210. 653 S.W.2d at 117.
211. 656 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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versed and remanded for trial.2 12 Foley, the bank's loan officer, had
required execution of a corporate resolution on a standardized bank form
before authorizing the transfer; the general manager signed the form as
"secretary" and his wife signed it as "vice president," even though neither
was an officer of the corporation. There was some evidence that Foley
knew the resolution was "bogus." Foley also requested a letter authorizing
the transaction, but permitted the transfer to occur upon the manager's
promise to supply one without actually receiving the letter. Given these
facts, the court held that summary judgment was improper since it could
not be concluded as a matter of law that the general manager had either
implied or apparent authority to withdraw the funds on his sole
authority.21 3
Three cases decided by the Corpus Christi court of appeals during the
survey period involved the issue of whether exemplary damages should be
assessed against the corporation. The test in these cases is usually whether
the agent who is acting is a "managerial agent," that is, one whose actions
may be deemed to be actions of the corporation itself.2 14 In Canon, U.S.A.
v. Carson Map Co. 215 a regional service manager was found to be acting
within a managerial capacity when he made certain product misrepresen-
tations, but the court held that the action involved only a breach of con-
tract for which exemplary damages do not lie.2 16 In Houston Lighting &
Power Co. v. Sue,2 17 the court awarded exemplary damages when corpo-
rate agents acted "with conscious indifference" to rights of the plaintiff in
not closing gates or maintaining fences on an easement over which the
plaintiff grazed cattle.21 8 In Western Construction Co. v. Valero Transmis-
sion Co. 219 the court held that the negligence of a managerial agent was
not sufficiently established to permit the award of exemplary damages. 220
In Engel v. Teleprompter Corp. 221 the court held that a restriction effec-
tive when a shareholder proposes to "sell or otherwise dispose of' shares
was not triggered by an indirect transfer, that is, the transfer of all the
212. Id. at 958. The trial court granted summary judgment based in part on the incorrect
theory that the two-year statute of limitations for conversion, rather than the four-year stat-
ute for breach of a depository contract applied to the suit.
213. Id. at 957-58. The court further noted that the checks used to originally deposit the
funds in the first corporation's account bore the signature of both the sole shareholder and
the general manager. The court suggested that this fact should have put the loan officer on
notice that the general manager may not have had authority to transfer the funds. Id.
214. See Treasure City v. Strange, 620 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no
writ).
215. 647 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
216. Id. at 323.
217. 644 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ refd n.r.e.).
218. Id. at 839-41. The court concluded that circumstantial evidence of the defendant
corporation's wanton and willful conduct justified the award of $125,000 in exemplary dam-
ages. Id. at 839.
219. 655 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
220. Id. at 254. The court stated that an award of exemplary damages against a corpora-
tion must be based on very specific findings of fact with respect to the corporate agent's acts
that form the basis of the suit. Id.
221. 703 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1983).
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shares of a corporation that owned a majority of the shares of the corpora-
tion whose shares were subject to the restriction. The scope of a share
transfer restriction is a matter of intention, but the court stated that such
restrictions are to be strictly construed and concluded that there was no
clear indication that the parties intended such a broad restraint. 222 The
court relied in part on the separate legal existence of the two corporations.
In a reverse stock split the number of shares held by each shareholder is
reduced proportionally. For example, in a 1-for-5 split, each holder of five
shares of the old stock becomes a holder of one new share. Reverse stock
splits may be used as "freeze-out" or "squeeze-out" tactics since an appro-
priate choice of ratio may reduce the holdings of the freezeout target to a
fraction of a share, and that fraction may be elimianted for cash under the
fractional share provision.223 The effect of this transaction is identical to a
cash merger where the target of the freeze-out is compelled to accept cash
for his shares. In Lewis v. Knutson ,224 however, the Fifth Circuit held that
a reverse stock split in which each holder of a fractional share had the
choice of "rounding up" to a whole share or accepting cash for his frac-
tional share was not a "freeze-out" and therefore the test of entire or in-
trinsic fairness applicable to freeze-out transactions under Delaware law
was not applicable.225
In Robinson v. T.M.E-DC, Inc. 226 the court upheld a "spin off" of as-
sets by the corporation through the device of creating a wholly owned sub-
sidiary and then distributing the shares of the subsidiary to the
shareholders of the parent corporation. 227 The distributed assets were the
real estate owned by the corporation and did not affect the trucking busi-
ness that was the major element of the corporation's business. The court
concluded that the transaction involved an exercise of ordinary business
judgment and did not involve a conflict of interest. The court also rejected
an argument based on the articles of incorporation, which granted addi-
tional rights to the preferred shareholders (including the plaintiff) to re-
ceive certain payments in the event of the "liquidation" of the corporation.
The spin off did not constitute a liquidation, according to the court, be-
cause the corporation continued in the trucking business following the spin
off, and also because the articles of incorporation expressly provided that
"[n]either the merger nor consolidation of the Corporation. . .nor a sale,
transfer or lease of all or any part of the assets of the Corporation, shall be
deemed to be a liquidation .... -228
Section 8.405(b) of the Texas Business & Commerce Code requires the
222. Id. at 134.
223. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.20 (Vernon 1980). For an example of this use of
the reverse stock split, see Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 I11. 2d 542, 322 N.E.2d
54 (1974).
224. 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983).
225. Id. at 239.
226. 566 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
227. Id. at 1085.
228. Id. at 1081.
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owner of a lost or stolen security to satisfy, among other things, "any other
reasonable requirements imposed by the issuer" as a prerequisite to ob-
taining a substitute certificate. 229 In Glaser v. Texon Energy Corp. 230 the
court held that a shareholder who failed to comply with a request from the
issuer for additional information as to how the shares were acquired and
the circumstances of their loss could not obtain a substitute certificate even
though the jury had determined that he was the owner of the shares repre-
sented by the lost certificate. 23'
Finally, in Global Natural Resources v. Bear, Sterns & Co. 232 the appel-
late court reversed a temporary injunction granted by the trial court with-
out notice and hearing on the ground that its practical effect would have
been to give the plaintiff essentially what it was seeking on the merits. 233
The plaintiff had sought to enjoin a British company that was the target of
a takeover attempt from completing a corporate acquisition that would
have increased significantly the number of outstanding voting shares in
friendly hands. The court accepted the argument that if the injunction had
been granted, the merger would not have occurred and the aggressors
might take over the company and disavow or disaffirm the transaction in
question. The opinion of the court gives little indication of the basis of
jurisdiction of the trial court in Dallas; similar suits to block the proposed
transaction had been unsuccessful in England and in a federal district
court in Cincinnati, Ohio. 234
G. Receiverships
InAubin v. Territorial Mortgage Co. ofAmerica, Inc. 235 the appointment
of a receiver on the trial court's own motion was upheld as not involving
an abuse of discretion. A derivative action had originally been filed in
which the applicant requested a restraining order against disbursement of
corporate assets; a subsequent amendment to the complaint requested an
appointment of a receiver. The defendant objected on the plausible
ground that the applicant was not a creditor authorized to obtain a receiver
under article 7.06 of the Texas Business Corporation Act. 236 The trial
court, however, relied on the broader article 7.05237 to appoint a receiver
on its own motion, relying on the catch-all clause, "[in any other actions
where receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages of the court
229. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.405(b) (Vernon 1968).
230. 702 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1983).
231. Id. at 572.
232. 642 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
233. Id. at 855.
234. Id. at 853.
235. 640 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
236. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.06, § A(4) (Vernon 1980). This article deals with
receiverships to effect the liquidation of a corporation and authorizes appointment of a re-
ceiver on the petition of a creditor "if it is established that irreparable damage will ensue to
the unsecured creditors of the corporation, generally, as a class . I..." Id.
237. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.05 (Vernon 1980). This article governs appoint-
ments of receivers to rehabilitate the corporation.
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of equity. ' 238 In affirming, the court of appeals relied on broad language
in earlier cases that Texas courts have broad discretionary and inherent
power to appoint receivers even in the absence of statutory authority. 239
The court also rejected constitutional arguments based on the application
of articles 7.05 and 7.06 to the particular case. 240
In Humble Exploration Co. v. Fairway Land Co. 24 1 and Humble Explora-
tion Co. v. Walker242 the Dallas court of appeals resolved a hotly contested
receivership proceeding originally brought by a group of working interest
owners of producing oil wells against the operator. The court held that a
receivership of the business of a corporation could be filed only under the
Texas Business Corporation Act 243 rather than under articles 2293 through
2320c of the Texas statutes.244 The court drew a distinction between a
receivership for a "business" subject to the Texas Business Corporation
Act and a receivership for "property or [a] fund" subject to article 2293.
The court concluded, however, that the applicants had failed to meet the
proof required on practically every necessary allegation for establishing a
right to the appointment of a receiver under article 7.05 and ordered the
receivership dissolved. 245 In a second opinion about a month later 246 the
court of appeals issued a writ of prohibition against the trial judge who
had continued the receivership despite the appellate court's opinion on the
theory that the opinion had no effect until a mandate was issued. The
appellate court held that its dissolution of the receivership operated instan-
ter on the basis of an analogy to a reversal of an order granting a tempo-
rary restraining order.247
H. Dissolution, Forfeiture, and Reinstatement
The dissolution of closely held corporations often appears to be an in-
formal and irregular process. Holliday v. Henry I Siegal Co. 248 is a good
238. Id. art. 7.05, § A(3).
239. See Berkshire Petroleum Corp. v. Moore, 268 S.W. 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1925, no writ).
240. 640 S.W.2d at 742.
241. 641 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
242. 641 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
243. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.04-.08 (Vernon 1980).
244. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2293, § 1 (Vernon 1971) authorizes a receivership
"between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund" if the
plaintiff's claim is probable and the property or fund is "in danger of begin lost, removed or
material injured."
245. 41 S.W.2d at 939. The court set forth the requirements that an applicant must
satisfy in order to justify appointment of a receiver under TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
7.05, § A (Vernon 1980) and held that appointment of the receiver was improper because the
applicants failed to show: (1) that they were creditors, shareholders, or that courts of equity
formerly appointed receivers in this type of action; (2) that their claim was reduced to a
judgment or admitted by the debtor in writing; (3) that the defendant corporation was insol-
vent; and (4) that all other legal and equitable remedies were inadequate. 641 S.W.2d at
939.
246. 641 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
247. Id. at 943.
248. 643 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), afl'd, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
162 (Jan. 14, 1984).
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example. A closely held corporation was dissolved without giving credi-
tors notice as required by the Texas Business Corporation Act. 249 Worse,
substantial assets were paid over to the shareholders without any effort to
first satisfy creditors and without keeping track of who had been paid and
who had not. The last sentence of paragraph 8 of article 1302-2.07 of the
Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act provides:
In the exercise of such powers [relating to the administration of the
dissolved corporation's assets], the directors and officers shall be trust-
ees for the benefit of creditors, shareholders, members, or other dis-
tributees of the corporation and shall be jointly and severally liable to
such persons to the extent of the corporate property and assets that
shall have come into their hands. 250
It appeared, however, that one of the directors had successfully established
that she had already paid $26,000 out of her personal funds to corporate
creditors (other than the plaintiff) in satisfaction of their claims, an amount
that was greater than the $20,000 of total assets received by all the share-
holders from the corporation when it was dissolved. On the basis of this
showing, the court held that the defendant was not liable for the claim of
the present creditor since all the assets that she had held as trustee had
been exhausted. 25' The court also refused to "disregard the corporate en-
tity" and hold the defendant personally liable on that ground.252 While
the result reached has an air of plausibility about it, it seems to be errone-
ous since the defendant had a fiduciary duty not to prefer some creditors
over others, and she had plainly not fulfilled that duty. In other words, the
plaintiff appeared to be entitled to a pro rata portion of the $20,000 of
assets, which the court's opinion failed to recognize. The Texas Supreme
Court has affirmed the decision of the court of appeals in the case.253
In Speier Tire Co. v. Tom Benson Chevway Rental & Leasing Inc. 254 the
249. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANNJ. art. 6.04, § A(2) (Vernon 1980) provides: "The corpora-
tion shall cause written notice by registered mail of its intention to dissolve to be mailed to
each known creditor of and claimant against the corporation."
250. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.07B (Vernon 1980).
251. 643 S.W.2d at 521. The appellate court thus reversed the trial court, which had held
that the defendant was liable with two other directors for the debt owed the plaintiff. Id. at
520.
252. Id. at 520.
253. 663 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. 1984). The Texas Supreme Court held that the trust fund
doctrine only requires distribution of total corporate assets to creditors, and that neither the
Texas corporation statutes or the trust fund doctrine mandates that the directors apply lim-
ited corporate assets proportionally to corporate debts. Id. at 826-27. Two justices dis-
sented, arguing persuasively that this result was not compelled by statute and had the clearly
undesirable practical consequence of encouraging directors to favor certain creditors over
other creditors when the assets were not sufficient to pay all creditors in full. Id. at 828-30
(Ray, J., dissenting). Such favoritism may be based on side payments to the directors or
simply a desire to curry favor with certain creditors. It is possible under the supreme court's
majority opinion that the disfavored creditor may have a direct cause of action against the
favored creditor. The most likely consequence, however, of the supreme court's unfortunate
decision is to increase the business of the already overburdened federal bankruptcy courts,
since many preferential payments encouraged by the supreme court's decision may be
voided as preferences under the Bankruptcy Code.
254. 643 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
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court recognized that the revival of the charter and right to do business of
a corporation, which had been forfeited for nonpayment of taxes, permits
the corporation to proceed with a suit commenced before the revoca-
tion.255 This result seems clearly to be contemplated by the statute.25 6
I Jurisdiction and Venue
In Siskind v. Villa Foundation257 the Texas Supreme Court upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction under article 203 1b258 over an Arizona school that
actively advertised for students within the State of Texas through periodi-
cals such as National Geographic and Sunset Magazine. 259 In addition,
the school sent application forms and detailed information through the
mails to a Texas resident as well as telephoning him. The court stated that
the quantity of Villa's contacts with Texas may be truly minimal, while the
qualities of these contacts are substantial. 260
In Hydrokinetics, Inc. v. Alaska Mechanical, Inc. 261 the Fifth Circuit
held that an Alaskan corporation was not amenable to suit in Texas where
its only contact was the purchase of "waste heat recovery silencer units"
from a Texas corporation that were delivered by the seller in Seattle,
Washington. Negotiations preceding the contract were entered into by
telex, telephone, and letter between the defendant in Alaska and the plain-
tiff in Texas; the only direct contacts by the defendant with Texas were the
visit of two officers of the defendant to inspect the plaintiffs equipment
and facilities, the acceptance of the defendant's offer to purchase by the
plaintiff in Texas, and payment for the units by checks mailed from
Alaska. The contract stated that it was to be controlled by Alaskan law.
After reviewing the Fifth Circuit precedents, the court concluded that the
contacts of the defendant were not sufficient to hold that the plaintiff had
"purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business within
Texas or invoked the benefits and protections of Texas law." 262 Judge Tate
dissented.
The major development with regard to venue is the enactment of a new
venue statute in 1983.263 In Campbell & Son Construction Co. v. Housing
Authority264 the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to obtain venue over a cor-
porate defendant on the theory that another corporation (as to which
255. Id. at 773.
256. See TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.17(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (current version at
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.305-.308, .312-.315 (Vernon 1982)).
257. 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982).
258. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
259. The school was an Arizona corporation. The court affirmed the appellate court's
dismissal of a suit against employees of the school, on the basis that the plaintiff alleged no
specific acts by the employees occurring in Texas. The plaintiff, therefore, could not sue
nonresident employees of a foreign corporation in a Texas court. 642 S.W.2d at 438.
260. Id. at 437.
261. 700 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1983).
262. Id. at 1029.
263. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1964-1983). For a brief
discussion of this statute, see supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text,
264. 655 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
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venue was admittedly proper) was the alter ego of the defendant. Not sur-
prisingly, the court appeared to be unsympathetic to this novel use of the
alter ego doctrine and limited its refusal to pierce the corporate veil to the
issue of venue.265
In W T Grinding & Supply v. Price Industries, Inc. 266 the court held that
a cause of action for breach of warranty of tools arose in the county where
both parties knew that the tools were to be used by plaintiff, and venue was
therefore proper in that state. 267 In TXO Production Corp. v. Prickette2 68 a
cause of action for breach of contract was held to arise in the county where
the contract was made.
J Securities Regulation
A number of important issues were considered during the survey period
by the state and federal courts and by the administrative agencies. In ad-
dition, the Texas Legislature made significant changes in the structure of
the Texas Securities Board through the device of "sunset review. '269 At
the federal level, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted rela-
tively minor amendments to its shareholder proposal regulations,270 to the
regulations relating to the manner in which registrants communicate with
beneficial owners of shares held by nominees, 27' and to the regulations
relating to disclosure of executive compensation.2 72 In addition, it made
permanent its "shelf registration" regulations with some modifications.273
The Commission also received a widely watched report from an advisory
committee on tender offers,274 and is currently considering how to respond
to the committee's numerous proposals for change. The Commission also
proposed further simplification of rule 145, relating to disposal of re-
stricted stock, by proposing essentially a uniform three-year holding pe-
riod for all shares.275
The Supreme Court of the United States decided two important securi-
ties cases during the survey period. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddle-
ston276 the court held that the express remedies provided by sections 11
and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 do not foreclose a remedy under
rule 1 Ob-5 for the same conduct.277 The Fifth Circuit thereafter extended
the reach of this decision to include the express remedy of section 9 of the
265. Id. at 276.
266. 647 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, no writ).
267. Id. at 90.
268. 653 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. App.-Waco 1983, no writ).
269. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 465, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2692.
270. Sec. Rel. 34-20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218-223 (adopted Aug. 16, 1983).
271. Sec. Rel. 34-20021, 48 Fed. Reg. 35,082 (adopted July 28, 1983).
272. Sec. Rel. 34-20220, 48 Fed. Reg. 44,467 (adopted Aug. 23, 1983).
273. Sec. Rel. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889 (adopted Nov. 17, 1983).
274. SEC Advisory Comm. on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations (July 8,
1983).
275. Sec. Rel. 33-6487, 48 Fed. Reg. 44,843 (proposed Sept. 23, 1983).
276. 103 S. Ct. 683, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1982).
277. Id. at 690, 74 L. Ed. 2d at 559; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77/(2) (1982).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934, over the dissent of Judge Gee. 278
The second significant case was a major insider trading case, Dirks v.
Securities & Exchange Commission.279 In holding that a tippee did not
violate the insider trading prohibitions of rule lOb-5 in the absence of
some duty to the issuer, the Supreme Court appears to have plunged the
entire area of tippee liability under that rule into uncertainty. 280 Only
time and continued litigation will delineate the precise scope of this newly
limited duty.
The major events at the Texas Securities Board during the survey period
stemmed from its first review by the Sunset Commission. As a result of
that review, the legislature adopted a number of housekeeping, public dis-
closure, and related amendments to the Securities Act. 28' Persons dealing
with the board should routinely examine the amendments adopted in 1983,
which mandate considerably greater disclosure than heretofore required
on many matters within the board's area of regulation. The legislature
added disqualifications for appointment and grounds for removal, and
mandated annual reports to the legislature and the governor. Also, the
legislature provided for further public disclosure of procedures and activi-
ties by the board, and subjected the board to the open meetings law. In
addition, the administrative provisions of the Act were brought into con-
formity with the Texas Administrative Procedure Act,282 and review was
expressly made subject to the substantial evidence rule. Changes were also
made in the penal provisions of the Act and the remedy of restitution to
the victim pf a fraudulent practice was expressly provided for.283 Largely
hortatory pivisions were added encouraging the board to maximize coor-
dination with federal and other states' securities laws while assuring pro-
tection to investors and minimizing regulatory burdens. 284 The
commissioner was given express power to waive or relax provision in the
board's rules that are unnecessary for the protection of investors.
285
Litigation in the state courts under the Texas securities law involved
relatively minor issues. In Weaver v. State,286 for example, the defendant
278. Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 718 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983); see 15
U.S.C. § 78i (1982).
279. 103 S. Ct. 3255, 77 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1983).
280. The court stated:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached
his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tip-
pee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.
.d. at 3264, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 925.
281. Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 465, §§ 1-9, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2688 (amending TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1 to -32).
282. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-14 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
283. d. art. 581-32.
284. Id. art. 581-28-1.
285. Id. art. 581-10, § D.
286. 652 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.). The court first
reversed the conviction on the ground that the indictment did not allege that disclosure of
the undisclosed fact was necessary to make other statements not misleading under TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29, § C(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984). On rehearing, however, the
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received a seven-year prison sentence plus a $5,000 fine for violation of
this statute. The defendant in Hawkins v. State 287 was more fortunate: he
received four years, probated, for failing to disclose that a colleague had
been previously convicted of a securities violation and for stating that the
investor's funds would be used exclusively in mining operations, when in
fact only $850 out of a total investment of $2500 would be used for that
purpose.288
Finally, in a favorable opinion for attorneys, a Texas court of appeals
reaffirmed the position that an attorney is liable for negligence only to his
client.289 The attorney owes no duty to third parties in the absence of priv-
ity of contract even if the third party directly and knowingly relies on the
attorney's opinion. 290 The case involved an opinion by counsel for a com-
puter software firm that a transaction between it and a county was binding
on the county. The plaintiff then advanced funds to the computer firm,
taking an assignment of the computer firm's rights to receive payment on
the contract. The attorney knew of the purpose of the opinion; indeed, the
plaintiff provided the language to be inserted in the opinion. It was deter-
mined later that the county had not validly entered into the contract and
therefore was not bound by it. The court also considered arguments that
the attorney, by issuing his opinion, aided and assisted in a sale of a secur-
ity in violation of the Texas Securities Act,291 and that the attorney made a
false and fraudulent representation in connection with the sale of a secur-
ity,292 but concluded that the transaction did not involve a "security. ' 293
court concluded that the conviction could be upheld under id. art. 581-29, § C(l) which
prohibits engaging in any fraud or fraudulent practice.
287. 656 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
288. Id at 73.
289. First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, Potts, Aikman, Hagin & Stewart, 648
S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ refd n.r.e.). The court noted the strong
trend toward adoption of a more liberal view in other jurisdictions, but declined to follow
that trend. Id. at 413. The court also rested its decision on the alternative ground that the
third person did not rely on the attorney's opinion. Id. at 414.
290. Id. at 413.
291. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1984).
292. Id. art. 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
293. 648 S.W.2d at 416.
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